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A NEW MODEL FOR OVERSIGHT OF
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES BY NONPROFITS?
Jannon Stein*
This Note discusses a New Jersey tax case, Fields v. Trustees of Princeton
University, that settled in 2016 after motion practice. The plaintiffs were
twenty-eight municipal taxpayers in Princeton who challenged Princeton
University’s entire property-tax exemption on the ground that the way the
University distributed royalty payments from patents to faculty inventors and
licensed these patents in joint ventures and other partnerships ran afoul of
the “profit test” that applies to educational property-tax exemptions in New
Jersey. This Note uses this litigation to discuss a potential conflict between
the Bayh-Dole Act, which encourages academic patent development, and
such profit tests on charitable and educational property exemptions in
several states. It concludes that while the model of litigation in Fields could
offer a new procedural oversight means over nonprofits, a better solution
involves substantive legislative reform that regularizes current ad hoc
payments between municipalities and large nonprofits and better aligns local
property taxes with federal policy.
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INTRODUCTION
From 2011 to 2016, a curious case wound itself through the New Jersey
Tax Court.1 In 2011, a small group of Princeton residents sued Princeton
University (the “University”) and the municipality where it is located, then
known as the Borough of Princeton,2 challenging the tax-exempt status of
1. See Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. 7672-2016 (N.J. Tax Ct. Apr. 13, 2016);
Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574, 578 (2015) (discussing the progress from
an initial filing to a denied interlocutory appeal); see also Complaint at 1, Estate of Lewis v.
Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. 010656-2011 (N.J. Tax Ct. July 8, 2011) [hereinafter 2011
Complaint]. This Note refers to these related actions as Fields.
2. The former Borough and Township of Princeton merged in 2013, partly to reduce tax
bills through efficiency. See Jon Offredo, Princeton Consolidation Pays Off: $61M Budget
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twenty-one properties that the University owns.3 In 2014 and 2015, four of
the plaintiffs filed a related suit, Fields v. Trustees of Princeton University,4
to challenge all of the University’s property-tax exemptions in Princeton.5
When the case settled in October 2016, it encompassed twenty-eight
plaintiffs challenging Princeton University’s property-tax exemption in toto.6
The plaintiffs had argued that the University’s collection and distribution of
patent revenues was too oriented around private profit to be exempt.7
This Note argues that this litigation demonstrates a new but fraught means
of oversight over nonprofit organizations. It also uses Fields to reveal
tensions between state and federal laws over the proper borders of the
revenue-generating activities of nonprofits and points to potential reforms to
resolve those tensions.
Part I presents the doctrinal background on how tax law regulates the
boundaries of the revenue-generating activities of nonprofits. It demonstrates
the differences between the federal exemption and state-level property-tax
exemptions before discussing how the Bayh-Dole Act’s incentivizing of
patent development by nonprofit institutions is situated in this framework.
Part II discusses the substantive tension between state laws with profit tests
for property-tax exemptions and the Bayh-Dole Act, which encourages
nonprofits to develop and commercialize patents. It concludes that the
discrepancies between the Bayh-Dole Act and profit tests for state propertytax exemptions do not result in a direct legal conflict between federal and
state laws.
This Note explains why the tension results in neither preemption nor
serious concerns from dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Yet, this Note
presents pragmatic policy arguments for why the federal and state-level laws
should be brought into closer alignment or delineated from each other with
greater clarity. This Note then contrasts the litigation enforcement model
used in Fields against recent and proposed legislative reforms in several
states. It analyzes how the legal doctrine that allows municipal taxpayer suits
could reshape the oversight of nonprofit organizations if Fields is taken up
Comes with Tax Rate Decrease, NJ.COM (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/
2013/04/princeton_consolidation_pays_o.html [https://perma.cc/DBD3-3Q8C].
But see
Krystal Knapp, Christie Perpetuates Myth That Consolidation Reduced Princeton Budget by
$3 Million, PLANET PRINCETON (Jan. 15, 2014), http://planetprinceton.com/2014/01/15/
christie-perpetuates-myth-consolidation-reduced-princeton-budget-3-million/
[https://perma.cc/F3P8-PB7B] (disputing the reduction).
3. New Jersey law allows partial taxation of properties. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6
(West 2017) (providing “that if any portion of such buildings are leased to profit-making
organizations or otherwise used for purposes which are not themselves exempt from taxation,
said portion shall be subject to taxation and the remaining portion only shall be exempt”); see
also infra Part I.B.2. The initial suit challenged particular buildings along these grounds. See
Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–6; W. Raymond Ollwerther, Challenge over Taxes, PRINCETON
ALUMNI WKLY. (Sept. 18, 2013), https://paw.princeton.edu/article/challenge-over-taxes
[https://perma.cc/4ULH-49V9].
4. 28 N.J. Tax 574 (2015).
5. See id. at 578.
6. See Complaint at 2, Fields, No. 7672-2016 [hereinafter 2016 Complaint]; Fields, 28
N.J. Tax at 578 (discussing the progress from filing to a denied interlocutory appeal).
7. See 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at 12.

2032

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

as a litigation model by other plaintiffs, as well as how different reform
statutes balance interests and concerns at stake in exemption policy.
Part III argues that while municipal taxpayer suits may represent a new
enforcement model for policing the borders of revenue generating and
distributing activities in the nonprofit sector, substantive legislative reform
would be preferable. It warns that local oversight through third-party
challenges cannot resolve the disconnect between local and federal laws.
Therefore, it concludes that substantive legislative reform provides a better
opportunity to address the concerns raised in Fields. This Part then examines
legislative models proposed or adopted in New Jersey, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and California.
Finally, Part IV advocates for reform modeled primarily after the
California legislation, which takes a nuanced approach to the linkages
between entity-level income, property use, and ad valorem taxation.
I. THE REGULATION OF NONPROFITS THROUGH TAX LAW
Part I introduces the issue of oversight of nonprofit business activities at
the federal and state levels. Part I.A sketches the broad contours of the
federal framework and presents the doctrinal context for how federal income
tax regulates the ways nonprofit corporations may generate revenue and what
they may do with it. Part I.A.1 explains that nonprofits can have positive
revenue, while Part I.A.2 clarifies that charitable organizations must provide
primarily public rather than private benefits. Part I.A.3 explains that
nonprofits are subject to what scholars call the “nondistribution constraint.”8
Part I.B clarifies that federal tax law and property-tax exemptions for
charitable organizations exist independently. Part I.B.1 explains New Jersey
law and uses it to illustrate how frameworks for local property-tax exemption
can differ significantly from the federal income-tax exemption. Part I.B.2
demonstrates that the “profit test” in New Jersey is a more restrictive
nondistribution constraint than that imposed under the federal framework.
Part I.B.3 presents how profit tests in several other states work.
Part I.C discusses how the Bayh-Dole Act functions as well as its history
and legacy. It explains that this federal law encourages universities and other
nonprofits to develop and commercialize patents. Thus, this law exacerbates
the discrepancies between the federal- and state-level schemes regulating
nonprofit revenues.
A. Introductory Doctrinal Background
Nonprofit law is often divided into two broad areas: (1) state laws
governing corporate status and (2) federal laws and policies connected to taxexempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.9 This latter
status confers such extensive advantages that it has become a synecdoche for
8. This term was coined by Henry Hansmann. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN, STEPHEN SCHWARZ & LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xiii–xiv (5th ed. 2015); see also I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2012).
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the entire sector10 and functions as a “signaling” device11 for a multitude of
actors who rely on it. The regulations tied to it are primary oversight tools
governing the sector.12 Local property-tax exemptions form a third body of
law affecting nonprofits; their considerations are not fully congruent with
those that apply to federal tax status. As this Note focuses on an intersection
between local property-tax exemptions and federal law, it sketches key
considerations for federal qualification to provide a contrasting background
for the legal issues at stake.
1. Nonprofits Can Generate Positive Revenue
Nonprofit organizations include major hospitals, universities, museums,
and other cultural institutions, some of which generate significant revenue.13
Scholars of urban economies often stress the importance of having robust
“meds and eds” sectors within municipalities and regions.14 Although many
outsiders assume the term “nonprofit” refers to a lack of substantial net
earnings,15 nonprofits can have significant annual earnings from their own
activities as well as from investment of very large endowments.16 The
distinction between nonprofit and for-profit corporations is not based on a
lack of substantial revenue; rather, the distinction lies in the purposes of the
organization, who may control it and how, and how revenues are spent.

10. See Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A
Two-Edged Sword?, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 133,
134 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 3d ed. 2017).
11. Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit/Nonprofit Border, 118
PENN ST. L. REV. 489, 491 (2014).
12. See, e.g., Brody & Cordes, supra note 10, at 142 (noting the role of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) in policing the “nonprofit-government border and the nonprofitcommercial border” as well as payments to insiders).
13. See Elise Young, Princeton’s Neighbors Say to Heck with Freebies—We Want Cash,
BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-02/princetons-neighbors-say-to-heck-with-freebies-we-want-cash
[https://perma.cc/2D2S-KWRH]
(estimating Princeton University’s endowment at $22.7 billion).
14. See, e.g., Carolyn Adams, The Meds and Eds in Urban Economic Development, 25 J.
URB. AFF. 571, 572 (2003); Adam John Parrillo & Mark de Socio, Universities and Hospitals
as Agents of Economic Stability and Growth in Small Cities: A Comparative Analysis, 11
INDUS. GEOGRAPHER 1, 2 (2014).
15. See, e.g., Jeanne Bell, Nonprofit Budgets Have to Balance: False!, BLUE AVOCADO,
http://www.blueavocado.org/content/nonprofit-budgets-have-balance-false
[https://perma.cc/J4BU-U7DC] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); Myths About Nonprofits, NAT’L
COUNCIL
NONPROFITS,
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/myths-about-nonprofits
[https://perma.cc/BM5T-TV46] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
16. At least one hundred nonprofits in New York State reported revenues over $10 million
in their most recent 990 filings, and many report assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
See Search Active Organizations, NAT’L CTR. CHARITABLE STAT., http://www.nccs.
urban.org/sites/all/nccs-archive/html/PubApps/search.php
[https://perma.cc/Q9GQ-PJTA]
(search with “Location—State” as “New York” and “Revenue Size” as “$10 million or more”)
(last visited Feb. 14, 2018). See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
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2. Nonprofits Must Exist for Public Benefit
Not-for-profit corporation laws and federal tax-exemption laws require
that such organizations pursue either specifically protected purposes or more
generally defined charitable purposes that provide public benefits.17 Various
state and federal provisions incorporate these requirements.18 These
legislative schemes put a premium on education.19 Still, all qualifying
organizations must show that their activities serve a primary purpose
designed to create public benefits.20
Broadly, when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or a court determines
that an organization’s other commercial activities are de minimis, revenues
from those activities are subject to federal unrelated business income tax
(UBIT).21 Otherwise, the organization may lose its exempt status.22 While
one scholar describes this as a system of rigid borders between nonprofit and
for-profit enterprises,23 others see these borders as murky.24 Sporadic
enforcement in this area contributes to a lack of clarity.25 This Note does not
delve deeply into this federal doctrine but rather examines how similar
activities are treated in the local property-taxation context where they are
perhaps even more politically controversial.26
17. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii) (2017) (requiring “a public rather than a private
interest”).
18. See id.; see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 102(a)(3-a), (3-b) (McKinney
2017) (defining “charitable corporation” and “charitable purposes”).
19. See Janne Gallagher, The Legal Structure of Property Tax Exemption, in PROPERTYTAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 3, 5 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002) (noting that most states exempt
educational institutions from property tax); see also I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2012) (setting
preferential deductibility for certain entities like churches and schools); I.R.C. § 509(a)
(defining private foundations as a default category with exceptions related to deductibility of
donations and public support); VIRGINIA G. RICHARDSON & JOHN FRANCIS REILLY, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., 2003 EO CPE, PUBLIC CHARITY OR PRIVATE FOUNDATION STATUS: ISSUES
UNDER IRC 509(a)(1)-(4), 4942(j)(3), AND 507, at 16–26 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopicb03.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9JW-8N9Z] (discussing the preferential “public
charity” status that applies to educational institutions).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2017); see also RICHARDSON & REILLY, supra
note 19, at 16–19, 29–31, 33–34.
21. See I.R.C. §§ 511–513; Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (including examples); see also Joseph
J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, Differential Taxation of Nonprofits and the
Commercialization of Nonprofit Revenues, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 195, 197, 201
(1998); Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s
Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2439, 2472, 2479, 2483–85 (2005). See
generally Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475 (2005).
22. See, e.g., Airlie Found. v. IRS, 283 F. Supp. 2d 58, 65 (D.D.C. 2003) (revoking a
conference center’s exemption because of the “‘commercial hue’ to the way Airlie carrie[d]
out its business”); see also Kelley, supra note 21, at 2474.
23. See Tahk, supra note 11, at 491.
24. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 508 (2002) (“Case law sheds virtually no light on the overall
interface between taxing commercial activity and revoking tax exemption because of it.”); see
also Kelley, supra note 21, at 2476 (calling this doctrinal terrain “vague and malleable”).
25. See Kelley, supra note 21, at 2484–85.
26. See Robert T. Grimm, Jr., Targeting the Charitable Property-Tax Exemption to
Collective Goods, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 321, 321.
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Finally, all charitable nonprofits, even educational institutions, must
demonstrate a primary public purpose as well as a lack of inurement or
substantial private benefit.27 The latter is found when an organization is set
up to provide an overwhelming amount of benefit to outsiders who are not
incidental members of a broad class of charitable beneficiaries.28 Inurement,
on the other hand, is found where key insiders are able to control and extract
charitable assets.29 Under current federal law, there is a regime of
intermediate sanctions that allows the IRS to apply excise taxes and penalties
if excessively beneficial transactions to specific insiders are not unwound.30
3. Nonprofits Are Subject to the “Nondistribution Constraint”
The concepts of private benefit and inurement in federal tax law are part
of what scholars deem the “nondistribution constraint” governing
nonprofits.31 This means that nonprofits cannot distribute assets as profits or
shares and must instead devote them to charitable purposes.32 State
corporation laws also enforce this principle. For example, New York’s Notfor-Profit Corporations Law embodies it in rules on institutional funds,33 the
sale of substantially all assets,34 and on dissolution.35 Taken together, statelevel not-for-profit corporations laws and federal tax-exemption law create a
regulatory framework that encourages nonprofits to pursue innovative
charitable ends for public benefit36 so long as they do not create or distribute
overly private benefits.37
B. Property-Tax Exemptions for Charitable Organizations
Are Independent of Federal Tax-Exempt Status
Local property-tax exemptions are independent from federal law. They
reside in state constitutions and state-level laws as well as in local adoptions
27. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2); § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii); see also John D.
Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1064–66 (2006); Peter G.
Dagher Jr., Note, Social Impact Bonds and the Private Benefit Doctrine: Will Participation
Jeopardize a Nonprofit’s Tax-Exempt Status?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3479, 3487–98 (2013)
(providing a doctrinal overview).
28. See Colombo, supra note 27, at 1064–65.
29. See, e.g., Airlie Found., Inc. v. United States, 826 F. Supp. 537, 551–52 (D.D.C. 1993)
(revoking exemption where an organization’s director transferred land and wealth to other
entities he and his family controlled), aff’d, 55 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
30. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958. The law refers to these insiders as
disqualified persons. See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1). See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4958–3 (2017).
31. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 501 (1981).
32. See id.
33. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 550–558 (McKinney 2017).
34. See id. §§ 509–511.
35. See id. § 1001(d)(3).
36. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting the importance of a pluralistic philanthropic sector); Evelyn Brody, Legal
Theories of Tax Exemption: A Sovereignty Perspective, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR
CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 145, 153 (discussing pluralism as a justification for tax
exemption).
37. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 27, at 1081–86.
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and assessments. All fifty states provide for some charitable exemptions.38
Many preexist the federal charitable exemption by decades;39 New Jersey’s
dates to 1851.40 Certain universities, including Yale, Columbia, Harvard,
and Princeton, can trace a tax-exempt status to a colonial charter that predates
federal law altogether.41
Given their longevity, educational and charitable property tax exemption
statutes do not anticipate the modern “knowledge economy,” in which
universities and other nonprofits play a driving role.42 Property tax
exemptions often have tighter restrictions on the generation and use of
revenues than either the federal exemption or state nonprofit corporation
laws. Neither a federal tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) nor even state status
as a not-for-profit corporation acts as a guarantee of a local property-tax
exemption.43
Federal law exempts nonprofits from tax on corporate income, which
functions both as a subsidy to capital formation44 and as an endowment
subsidy.45 The property-tax exemption, however, works much more like a
pure subsidy.46 Because it can significantly reduce an organization’s
ongoing costs compared to the costs faced by for-profit competitors and local
neighbors, property-tax exemption can subsidize production factors in
addition to capital asset formation.47
Yet for many small nonprofits, especially many religious organizations,
the property-tax exemption protects the sole major asset of the
organization—one that is essential to the organization’s ability to fulfill its
functions.48 Some scholars argue that protecting religious property from tax
38. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 4.
39. The federal exemptions date to 1894. See Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the TaxExempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2008, at 105, 106,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y6S-GMJD].
40. See AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 465 (2015).
41. See, e.g., Peter Dobkin Hall, Is Tax Exemption Intrinsic or Contingent? Tax
Treatment of Voluntary Associations, Nonprofit Organizations, and Religious Bodies in New
Haven, Connecticut, 1750-2000, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19,
at 253, 256–58 (detailing the early history of Yale). These were complex documents; at one
point, Princeton’s charter restricted it to an annual income equivalent to 20,000 bushels of
wheat. See ALEXANDER LEITCH, A PRINCETON COMPANION 89–90 (1978).
42. See, e.g., infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (discussing how the Bayh-Dole
Act spurred this economic shift).
43. See, e.g., infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
44. See Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L.
REV. 283, 285, 296 (2011).
45. Id. at 298–300, 306–08.
46. See, e.g., Joseph J. Cordes, Marie Gantz & Thomas Pollak, What Is the Property-Tax
Exemption Worth?, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 81, 81;
Dick Netzer, Local Government Finance and the Economics of Property-Tax Exemption, in
PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 47, 58–60.
47. Philadelphia used this argument to justify its Voluntary Contribution Plan in the early
1990s. See David B. Glancey, PILOTs: Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, in PROPERTY-TAX
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 211, 224; see also Netzer, supra note 46, at 69–
74 (discussing when charging nonprofits for local services makes sense).
48. See, e.g., Cordes, Gantz & Pollak, supra note 46, at 85; Stephen Diamond, Efficiency
and Benevolence: Philanthropic Tax Exemptions in 19th-Century America, in PROPERTY-TAX
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 115, 117; see also Deirdre Dessingue, The
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liens is at the historical core of all nonprofit law.49 They suggest that the
separate sovereignty of the church is the root of why nongovernmental
organizations that create public goods receive tax exemption.50 State laws
and cases, meanwhile, tend to stress that exemptions are grants by the
sovereign state and that the burden of demonstrating qualification must be on
the applicant.51
From a fiscal point of view, property-tax exemptions tend to provide the
greatest subsidies to nonprofits that own property in municipalities with high
property values and high tax assessments,52 although tax-rate competition
between municipalities plays a role as well.53 Such subsidies may reduce
incentives for nonprofits to rent office space and other property in areas with
lower property values that might benefit from investment in the local
economy.54 Importantly, property taxes are often the largest source of
municipal revenues,55 making choices about rates and exemptions highly
controversial. The recent limitation of the deductibility of state and local
taxes coupled with the near-doubling of the standard deduction will likely
exacerbate tensions over local charitable exemptions from property tax as
both home owners and charities find their budgets tightened as a result of the
federal tax reform.56
Special Case of Churches, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at
173, 173–74, 176–77.
49. See Dessingue, supra note 48, at 173; Diamond, supra note 48, at 116–17; see also
Brody & Cordes, supra note 10, at 141 (citing Genesis 47:26 for a land tax excluding priestly
property).
50. See Dessingue, supra note 48, at 176.
51. See Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574, 580 (2015) (“Statutes granting
exemption from taxation represent a departure and consequently they are most strongly
construed against those claiming exemption.” (quoting Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of
Princeton, 172 A.2d 420, 422 (N.J. 1961))); see also infra note 225 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Charles Brecher & Thad Calabrese, CityLaw: Three Policy Questions for
Nonprofit Property Tax Exemptions, CITYLAND (May 5, 2015), http://www.cityland
nyc.org/citylaw-three-policy-questions-for-nonprofit-property-tax-exemptions/
[https://perma.cc/6FAN-WVCN] (providing New York City estimates). But see Joan M.
Youngman, The Politics of the Property-Tax Debate: Political Issues, in PROPERTY-TAX
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 23, 27–29 (noting valuation difficulties).
Furthermore, problems with using property taxes as a proxy for taxing wealth have been noted
by scholars for decades. See, e.g., Comment, Judicial Restoration of the General Property Tax
Base, 44 YALE L.J. 1075, 1075 n.1 (1935).
53. See, e.g., Peter M. Mieszkowski & George R. Zodrow, Taxation and the Tiebout
Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes, 27
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1098, 1099–1100 (1989) (discussing competition in tax rates and
services).
54. This is because most states only exempt properties owned by nonprofits, not those
rented by nonprofits. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 6–9. But see Cordes, Gantz & Pollak,
supra note 46, at 99–106 (arguing that decisions to own or to lease property also depend on
the deductibility of depreciation).
55. See, e.g., DIV. OF LOCAL GOV’T & SCH. ACCOUNTABILITY, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE
COMPTROLLER, PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 1 (2013), https://www.osc.
state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/propertytax_exemptions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DZF9NE9Y] (noting that they are the largest source of revenue for New York State municipalities).
56. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1: Nonprofit Analysis of the Final Tax Bill
Proposal, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/
sites/default/files/documents/tax-bill-summary-chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBL4-D7DT].
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Because local property taxes support very local benefits like police, fire,
sewage, road maintenance, and school services, some states and
municipalities request that large nonprofits pay annual payments in lieu of
taxes (PILOT) to partially compensate local governments for such services.57
Over the past few decades, such PILOTs have become a regular part of the
budgets of the largest nonprofits, especially colleges and universities.58
Princeton University’s PILOT to the municipality and the neighboring West
Windsor Township is the tenth-highest in the nation.59
In many states, property-tax exemptions have a two-prong test:
(1) whether the property is owned by a favored legal entity (e.g., a nonprofit,
educational institution, or church) and (2) whether it is held for a favored use
(e.g., charitable, public, educational, or religious).60 Other states, however,
including New Jersey, apply additional prongs or requirements, including
“profit tests.”61
Yet, even in states without a separate profit test, fears of private benefit
shape how courts interpret claims of exemption. A New York case from
2015, Greater Jamaica Development Corp. v. New York City Tax
Commission,62 illustrates how a two-prong test works. There, the court
denied an exemption for parking lots via the use prong.63 Although a
community development corporation with § 501(c)(3) status owned the lots
and made a credible argument that they advanced its federally exempt
purposes,64 these purposes did not fit the use categories of New York’s Real
Property Tax Lax section 420-a.65 The court also concluded that the lots
provided private benefit that “inure[d]” to local businesses,66 even though
under federal law, inurement is understood to be benefit to key insiders that
control the organization rather than private benefit per se.67
Ocean Pines Ass’n, Inc. v. Commissioner68 shows the different approach
federal law takes. There, a nonprofit homeowners’ association owned beach
parking lots and a clubhouse accessible only to its members.69 The court
construed parking-lot income to be derived from activities creating private
benefits rather than ones advancing the organization’s social welfare
57. See generally Adam H. Langley, Daphne A. Kenyon & Patricia C. Bailin, Payments
in Lieu of Taxes by Nonprofits: Which Nonprofits Make PILOTs and Which Localities Receive
Them (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WP12AL1, 2012),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/langley-wp12al1-full_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LHD-9JFW].
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 6.
60. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a(1)(a) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-278.3 (2017).
61. See infra Part I.B.1.
62. 36 N.E.3d 645 (N.Y. 2015).
63. Id. at 652–53.
64. Id. at 651–52.
65. Id. at 652–53; see also N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a.
66. Greater Jamaica Dev. Corp., 26 N.E.3d at 653.
67. See Colombo, supra note 27, at 1067–73; Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to
Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 744–45 (2007).
68. 672 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2012).
69. Id. at 289.
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mission.70 It concluded that the association had to pay UBIT;71 the overall
exemption was preserved.72
In some ways, the outcomes of these cases were quite similar. In each, a
nonprofit had to pay taxes on its parking lots. In the federal case, an
organization had to pay UBIT on parking-lot income, while in the New York
case, one had to pay property taxes on its parking lots. Yet one involved a
partial tax, while the other denied exemption for a particular parcel of real
property. Additionally, the cases demonstrate that a property used to
generally advance a charitable purpose may not qualify under the specific
“actual use” standards for charitable property-tax exemptions that exist in
every state.73 Property-tax exemptions are thus not available on a general
basis to nonprofits. In states that apply a further profit test, even tighter limits
may constrict nonprofit activities.
1. Profit Tests Differ Significantly from Federal Exemption Law
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated its exemption doctrine as a threepart test in Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Township74: “(1) [the
corporation] must be organized exclusively for the [purposes of the
exemption category]; (2) its property must be actually and exclusively used
for the tax-exempt purpose; and (3) its operation and use of its property must
not be conducted for profit.”75 Although statutory changes rendered the
exclusive-use question moot in 198576 and similar limits on schools had
already been removed in 1913,77 New Jersey courts still apply the rest of test.
Its “prongs [are] respectively referred to as (1) the ‘organization test,’ (2) the
‘use test,’ and (3) the ‘profit test.’”78
This framework for property tax exemption is not a mirror of the tests for
federal income tax exemption under § 501(c)(3). Yet the tests seem
comparable at first glance. The “organization test” under New Jersey law
closely resembles the “organized test” under federal law,79 in that it focuses
on whether charters, bylaws, and other documents show an exclusively
70. Id. at 289–92.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 287–89, 292.
73. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 9. But see N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 494-a
(McKinney 2017) (allowing exemptions to be granted retroactively to the date of deed in New
York City); Not-For-Profit (NFP) Organization Property Tax Exemptions/Reductions, N.Y.C.
DEP’T
FIN.,
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/benefits/benefits-not-for-profitorganizations.page [https://perma.cc/XW65-DEQA] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (documenting
New York City’s related policy of allowing a contemplated use exemption).
74. 472 A.2d 517 (N.J. 1984).
75. Id. at 518.
76. See Int’l Sch. Servs., Inc. v. West Windsor Township, 21 A.3d 1166, 1174 (N.J. 2011).
77. See Pingry Corp. v. Hillside Township., 217 A.2d 868, 870–71 (N.J. 1966) (noting
that exclusive use language for schools was added in 1903 and removed in 1913); see also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2017).
78. Borough of Hamburg v. Trs. of Presbytery of Newton, 28 N.J. Tax 311, 318 (2015)
(exempting buildings used to store church documents because the use was “reasonably
necessary”).
79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (2017).
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exempt purpose.80 This purpose, however, must be enumerated in the
property-tax exemption statute. Neither status as a not-for-profit corporation
under New Jersey law81 nor being organized for purposes exempt under
§ 501(c)(3) is sufficient.82
The New Jersey statute is complex and contains targeted language for
specific types of exemption, but all categories are subject to the limitation
that “in case of all the foregoing, the buildings, or the lands on which they
stand, or the associations, corporations or institutions using and occupying
them as aforesaid, are not conducted for profit . . . .”83 The New Jersey Tax
Court has stressed that the “profit test” is a “pragmatic inquiry”84 with a
limited de minimis exception that will not protect a property where
substantial nonexempt activity occurs.85 Although de minimis profits and
commercial activities can be permissible,86 New Jersey does not consider an
organization’s exempt status under § 501(c)(3) controlling for property tax
disputes.87 The application form indicates that “a for-profit motive, as
evidenced by the facts, invalidates exemption, i.e., is the organization’s
structure, financial agreements, tuitions, fees set etc. with the intent to make
a profit.”88

80. See, e.g., Black United Fund of N.J., Inc. v. City of East Orange, 17 N.J. Tax 446, 455
(1998), aff’d, 772 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[The organization’s] certificate
of incorporation provides that its purpose is to [distribute funds] . . . to other federally taxexempt organizations . . . . The organization’s bylaws provide for the same . . . . These
purposes . . . are not identified as exempt purposes in N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.”).
81. Id. at 449.
82. Id.
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2017) (emphases added). For properties exempt on
“charitable, benevolent, or religious” grounds, the statute continues:
the exemption . . . shall extend . . . where the [exempt] work therein carried on is
supported partly by fees and charges received from or on behalf of beneficiaries
using or occupying the buildings; provided the building is wholly controlled by and
the entire income therefrom is used for said charitable, benevolent or religious
purposes . . . .
Id. (emphases added).
84. AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 496 (2015) (applying a
requirement for a “pragmatic inquiry into profitability. . . . [where] mechanical centering on
income and expense figures is to be avoided” (quoting Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn
Township, 472 A.2d 517, 526 (N.J. 1984)).
85. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 172 A.2d 420, 424 (N.J. 1961)
(denying exemption as press works regularly served outside businesses); Phillipsburg
Riverview Org. v. Town of Phillipsburg, 27 N.J. Tax 188, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013)
(denying exemption to an arts organization that allowed artists to profit from classes and
exhibitions on its premises); Greenwood Cemetery Ass’n of Millville, Inc. v. City of Millville,
1 N.J. Tax 408, 414 (1980) (denying exemption for cemetery parsonage where an inhabitant
regularly used it for a side business).
86. See AHS Hosp. Corp., 28 N.J. Tax at 534 (collecting cases).
87. See, e.g., Essex Props. Urban Renewal Assocs., Inc. v. City of Newark, 20 N.J. Tax
360, 368, 370 (2002) (confirming federal nonprofit status is irrelevant and concluding that the
plaintiff provided insufficient evidence that its senior and disabled housing was run in a
charitable manner); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
88. See Initial Statement of Organization Claiming Property Tax Exemption, N.J. DEP’T
ST.,
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/lpt/initialstment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TJ5Q-YSL8] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
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In the leading case for the “dominant motive” test, Kimberley School v.
Town of Montclair,89 the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that the
relevant inquiry was “not so much for . . . whether [a school’s] income
exceeds the cost of operation in any particular year or years, but rather
whether charges are fixed with the obvious intention of yielding a profit.”90
It considered factors that could show inurement to insiders as well as
excess of income over costs, and the actual and possible use of such excess;
the existence and extent of [the school’s] accumulated surplus and the
purpose to which it may be put; . . . the scale of salaries paid to its teachers
and officials as compared with similar schools, public as well as
private . . . .91

These criteria are less clearly defined than those used in federal law. The
IRS has issued detailed regulations for calculating reasonable compensation
to key employees.92 These rules focus on “excess benefit” transactions where
the charitable organization transfers more than the value of the consideration
it receives.93 They exclude most initial contracts,94 which allows nonprofits
to negotiate for top talent. New Jersey’s factors for evaluating reasonable
compensation are independent from this scheme and have been more
restrictively applied.95
Yet neither surplus revenues nor tuition rates set to produce such is
evidence of a profit motive, according to an influential case, City of Trenton
v. State Division of Tax Appeals.96 There, a court evaluating an exemption
claimed by Rider College (now known as Rider University) held that such
surpluses represented “plan[ning] on a sound fiscal basis for the replacement
of antiquated facilities or the expansion of facilities.”97 Importantly, the
court distinguished the school’s governance and compensation from its past
practices, noting that it had ceased paying its “vocational advisers” high
commissions for generating admissions.98
A more recent case demonstrates that private benefit to outsiders is still a
significant disqualification in New Jersey. In Phillipsburg Riverview
Organization v. Town of Phillipsburg,99 an appellate court affirmed Judge
Vito Bianco’s decision to deny exemption to a community arts center that let
artists derive profits for exhibitions, classes, and performances at the
space.100 Although the plaintiff argued that the question of profit making
89. 65 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1949).
90. Id. at 505.
91. Id.
92. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2012) (taxing excess benefit transactions by nonprofits); Treas.
Reg. § 53.4958 (2017) (providing definitions and many other specifics).
93. See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A).
94. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c).
95. See AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 515–25 (2015)
(rejecting the federal rules as determinative of the reasonableness of salaries and
compensation).
96. 166 A.2d 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
97. Id. at 781–82.
98. See id. at 781 n.12.
99. 27 N.J. Tax 188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
100. Id. at 194.
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should focus on the owning organization,101 the court disagreed. It noted that
exemption statutes are read strictly against claimants and held that the
plaintiff failed to show that “the entire income” from the space would be
reinvested in the organization.102 Importantly, the “entire income”
reinvestment requirement applies to properties with a charitable or religious
exemption but not to educational ones.103
Other New Jersey cases consider additional factors as evidence of a profit
motive. In a recent unpublished opinion, the New Jersey Tax Court found
above- or at-market rates for ballet classes to be sufficient grounds to deny
exemption for a dance school building, even though the owner had a broader
nonprofit purpose it pursued more fully at other locations.104 Although this
case is not precedential, it shows that reinvesting surpluses from seemingly
commercial activities at a specific location towards an overall exempt
purpose may not protect a property-tax exemption because of the interaction
of the use test and the profit test.
In a more significant case, AHS Hospital Corp. v. Town of Morristown,105
Judge Bianco revoked the entire property tax exemption of a large hospital.
He saw its commercial operations and collaborations with for-profit entities
as too interwoven with its exempt activities.106 In that case, he applied the
standard from City of Trenton: “[I]f [the court] can trace [profit] into
someone’s personal pocket [the organization will] not be entitled to tax
exemption.”107
The most recent edition of the New Jersey Tax Assessors’ Manual requires
that a parcel be neither owned nor operated for profit,108 but it excepts
academic properties partially leased to profit-making organizations. There,
it allows a partial exemption on the remainder of the building or a complete
exemption only if the lease (1) lasts less than four months (2) is not a profitseeking transaction, (3) is de minimis, and (4) only produces income devoted
to the organization’s exempt purpose.109 This administrative practice
suggests that profit limits on academic property are intended to be fairly
strict.

101. Id. at 192.
102. Id. at 193 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4–3.6 (2017)).
103. See supra note 83; infra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
104. Township of Cranbury v. Princeton Ballet Soc’y, No. 010651-2012, 2014 WL
4417744, at *1 (N.J. Tax Ct. Sept. 3, 2014).
105. 28 N.J. Tax 456 (2015).
106. Id. at 513.
107. Id. at 496 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting City of Trenton v. State
Div. of Tax Appeals, 166 A.2d 777, 782 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)).
108. See PROP. ADMIN., HANDBOOK FOR NEW JERSEY ASSESSORS 96, 274–78, 297–300
(2017), http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/assessorshandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HKA9-ZGSD].
109. Id. at 297.
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2. New Jersey’s De Minimis Exception Has Been
More Strictly Interpreted than Federal Analogs and Fails
to Accommodate Complex Business Practices
New Jersey case law shows that while the “profits test” has been gradually
modified, its exceptions are narrow. Older cases demonstrate little tolerance
for buildings used for multiple purposes, both charitable and commercial. In
Greenwood Cemetery Ass’n of Millville, Inc. v. City of Millville,110 the New
Jersey Tax Court denied exemption for a cemetery parsonage, where the
caretaker’s wife used it to run a side business selling memorial plaques.111
The court found that the activity was substantial, not de minimis.112
Similarly, in Princeton University Press v. Borough of Princeton,113 the
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that Princeton University Press’s
exemption claim failed because its facilities were not exclusively used for
exempt purposes: beyond its own academic publishing activity, it regularly
contracted with various businesses to serve their printing needs. The court
held this that “[was] not an occasional or incidental activity, or, if engaged in
regularly, one which [was] of an inconsequential or de minimis character.”114
Although the legislature has adjusted the exemption statute since this case,
making the use test now one of actual rather than exclusive use, the holding
is still substantially good law.
These older cases show that, although each prong must be independently
met,115 there was a great deal of interaction between the profit test and the
exclusive use test. Activities that generated a profit for insiders, employees,
or outsiders were not necessarily suspect because courts were persuaded that
these proved the “dominant motive” sought in Kimberley School.116 Rather,
they also demonstrated uses of the property for nonexempt purposes.117
The newer partial exemption framework is much closer to the
“fragmentation” principle under UBIT.118 The relevant language allows an
educational or charitable organization to lease out portions of property to forprofit institutions or use them for nonexempt activities as long as those
The parcel-by-parcel nature of property-tax
portions are taxed.119
exemptions would also seem suited to splitting off nonexempt activities and
revenues from exempt uses and functions.120 As the parking-lot cases show,
some profitable uses can be isolated to specific taxed parcels. Yet the
110. 1 N.J. Tax 408 (1980).
111. Id. at 411, 414.
112. Id. at 414.
113. 172 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1961).
114. Id. at 424.
115. See Hunterdon Med. Ctr. v. Township of Readington, 951 A.2d 931, 941 n.13 (N.J.
2008) (noting the use test is “superfluous” if either of the others is not met).
116. Kimberley Sch. v. Town of Montclair, 65 A.2d 500, 505 (N.J. 1949).
117. They also do not adhere to the “entire income” reinvestment requirement. See supra
notes 83, 102 and accompanying text.
118. See Stone, supra note 21, at 1488. Under this concept, the IRS taxes discrete activities,
like advertising, even if conducted within the broad scope of exempt operations.
119. See supra note 3.
120. See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text.
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complexity of modern business practices puts strain on the partial exemption
framework.
The New Jersey Supreme Court directly addressed difficult-to-isolate
mixtures of commercial and exempt activities in a recent case, International
Schools Services, Inc. v. West Windsor Township.121 There, a nonprofit
serving international schools abroad had various partnerships with other
entities, including some for-profit ones that it leased property to within the
same complex at below-market rates.122 Although the organization never
claimed a property-tax exemption for those areas, the court nonetheless found
the arrangement improper as the support for the for-profit entities was
commingled in the use of the entire property.
Similarly, the treatment of joint ventures in AHS diverges significantly
from federal exemption standards. Under federal law and many state
incorporation statutes, joint ventures can be tricky for nonprofits; their
permissibility can depend on the degree of control by related parties that
could take the nonprofit beyond the limits of its exempt purposes.123 Many
such arrangements are possible for nonprofits, however, as nonprofits may
generally invest their assets in any investments they find prudent.124 As long
as the joint venture is a separate legal entity and fiduciary responsibilities are
met, the nonprofit should be able to receive after-tax dividends or profits
from the subsidiary.125
Yet, these collaborations, which Judge Bianco described as “labyrinthine
corporate structures” in AHS,126 present obstacles to maintaining a propertytax exemption in New Jersey. The main issue in the case involved
commingling of uses rather than simply revenues. Although the fact that
many of the same actors were involved at highest levels of the collaborations
and joint ventures raised concerns,127 the main crux was not whether there
was separate accounting of arms-length transactions.128 Rather, Judge
Bianco considered how the profit-oriented entities used the property, looking
for a mixing of exempt uses with for-profit uses such that the property
benefitted the for-profit actors.129 His analysis included whether particular
profit-making physicians worked throughout the hospital buildings.130
121. 21 A.3d 1166 (N.J. 2011).
122. Id. at 1178.
123. See Dagher, supra note 27, at 3495–98 (discussing the IRS policy on nonprofit
participation in joint ventures).
124. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 552 (McKinney 2017). Some assets
may be restricted by deed or contract. Fiduciary duties also apply to nonprofit board
investments, while significant disposition of assets may be subject to other regulations. See,
e.g., §§ 509–510.
125. See, e.g., David A. Levitt & Steven R. Chiodini, Taking Care of Business: Use of a
For-Profit Subsidiary by a Nonprofit Organization, A.B.A. (June 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/06/03_levitt.html
[https://perma.cc/7EFX-BRER].
126. AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 465 (2015).
127. See id. at 474, 513–14 (noting overlapping high-level personnel and finding it
impossible to construe the operations as arms-length transactions).
128. Id. at 500–02.
129. See id. at 501, 506.
130. See id. at 501–02.
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These questions illustrate how hard it is to borrow an income
fragmentation approach and apply it to a property-tax exemption law like the
current one in New Jersey. Assessors can fairly easily separate different
types of income and selectively apply taxes to certain streams. This targeted
taxation is harder with ad valorem taxation of property, where the assessment
is based on the relative value of an asset. Scholars of taxation call the real
property tax a tax on land rent131 but also consider assessment a proxy for
measuring capital accumulation,132 that is, the increase in wealth attributable
to increased value or utilization of the property.133 But it is difficult to break
out a piece of increased value and attribute it to a commercial or profitable
use of the property, particularly if this use cannot be physically demarcated.
Finding it impossible to make such a demarcation, Judge Bianco denied
the hospital the property-tax exemption. In reaching this holding, he tackled
the hospital’s assertion that it would mean “the traditional and historic means
by which hospitals throughout New Jersey provided hospital services will
have always violated the Statute and the Statute is a nullity.”134 Discussing
the legislative history and case law on hospital exemptions, he concluded that
there was no endorsement of profit making by hospitals when the exemption
was codified.135
Here, he noted an early case, Bancroft Training School v. Borough of
Haddonfield,136 which examined the shift from an 1895 statute to one enacted
in 1903. The former exempted certain institutions solely on their
incorporation status, while the latter included the “not conducted for profit”
limit on academic property and the “entire income” reinvestment requirement
for charitable exemption.137 The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned there
that this clearly demonstrated “the legislative purpose . . . to exclude . . .
enterprises which may be benevolent in spirit, but which are conducted for
private gain.”138
This was a landscape of obstacles for Princeton University in Fields, given
its technical collaborations and many partnership investments.139 Although
131. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 413 (5th ed. 1989).
132. See id. at 411–13 (contrasting benefit theory with land rent); id. at 417–18 (discussing
market-value assessment); id. at 419–21 (illustrating how these dynamics affect capital); see
also Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 53, at 1099–101, 1140–41 (modeling theories of real
property taxation and concluding that the scale of the inquiry, that is, metropolitan, regional,
or national, affects accuracy, but that nationally property taxation depresses returns to capital,
while land rents may be regionally efficient).
133. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 131, at 417–18.
134. AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 479 (2015).
135. See id. at 494–95 (discussing the statute that first introduced a hospital exemption).
The court noted that “[p]erhaps this reflects . . . recognition of the evolving importance of
hospitals . . . and the differing purposes between hospital uses and charitable uses. . . . [Yet]
it is clear that the Legislature in 1913 did not condone the use of hospital property for-profit.”
Id.
136. 82 A. 20 (N.J. 1911); see also AHS Hosp. Corp., 28 N.J. Tax at 491.
137. Bancroft Training Sch., 82 A. at 21.
138. Id.
139. Princeton University’s Form 990-T filing for 2015 lists multiple partnership
agreements as well as unrelated business taxable income of negative $34,221,249. Trs. of

2046

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

the “entire income” limit applies only to organizations with “charitable,
benevolent or religious” use exemptions,140 academic institutions are subject
to the “not conducted for profit” requirement.141 This distinction might have
meant that the court would view profit to outsiders or faculty less strictly, yet
continuing the litigation could have been risky for Princeton University.
Furthermore, Judge Bianco was presiding, and he showed no willingness in
AHS to accede to legislative acquiescence to business practices in the sector.
As such, property-tax exemption laws and judicial interpretations of them
have created a precarious compliance landscape for nonprofits with
budgetary concerns.
3. Some Other State Laws Operate in a Similar Way
While New Jersey’s charitable and educational property-tax exemptions
are quite narrow, they are not unique: several other states apply profit tests
to property-tax exemptions. Ohio’s exemption for colleges and academies
specifically includes a profit limitation.142 The state’s limits on other
charitable or educational institutions are weaker yet also apply a profit limit
on leased property.143
Profit motive plays a central role in Ohio property-tax exemption law, yet
the test applied is somewhat more lenient than in New Jersey. Under Ohio’s
standard, “profit is defined as the excess of price over cost,”144 but courts
distinguish between the mere presence of surpluses and “a view to profit.”145
This standard was set by an early Ohio decision, which extended statutory
property-tax exemptions to private schools as purely public charities
precisely because such schools might be run “without any view to profit.”146
Under this principle, Ohio courts have judged lease terms harshly.147 Yet

Princeton Univ., Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (2015 Form 990-T) (on
file with Princeton University, Office of the Treasurer, Tax Department).
140. See supra notes 83, 102, 137 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 83, 137 and accompanying text. Any creation of intellectual property,
even beyond Bayh-Dole Act activities, could pose property-tax problems if faculty were bound
by holdings like that in Phillipsburg Riverview Organization v. Town of Phillipsburg, 27 N.J.
Tax 188, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying
text.
142. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(4) (West 2017) (exempting “[p]ublic
colleges and academies . . . not used with a view to profit”).
143. See id. § 5709.121(A)(2) (exempting indirect use only if the property is “under the
direction or control of such institution . . . for use in furtherance of or incidental to its
charitable, educational, or public purposes and not with the view to profit”).
144. 250 Shoup Mill, L.L.C. v. Testa, 60 N.E.3d 1254, 1259 (Ohio 2016); see also Seven
Hills Sch. v. Kinney, 503 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ohio 1986) (defining profit similarly, but noting
“[t]he legislature is of course free to define profit in any manner it sees fit”).
145. See Craftsmen Recreation Club, Inc. v. Testa, 31 N.E.3d 154, 157 (Ohio Ct. App.
2015).
146. Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229, 247 (1874) (noting that “private property . . . is
often used for . . . education, like property in ordinary business, as a means of profit”).
147. See, e.g., 250 Shoup Mill, 60 N.E.3d at 1255 (denying exemption even where lessor
funneled profits to lessees because Ohio “bars a claim of vicarious exemption”);
Anderson/Maltbie P’ship v. Levin, 937 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ohio 2010) (noting profit to either
the lessor or the lessee voids exemption).
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they also broadly allow exemptions for activities reasonably necessary to a
charitable or educational purpose, such as restaurants,148 parking lots,149 and
a Girl Scout memorabilia store.150
Ohio law specifically determines that a scientific research organization
will be considered charitable and educational even if it “operates in a manner
that results in an excess of revenues over expenses”151 as long as the surplus
is reinvested toward its exempt purposes. The law further specifies that “any
scientific information diffused by the organization . . . of particular . . . benefit
to any of its individual members [shall not] be used to deny the exemption . . .
provided [that it] is available to the public for purchase or otherwise.”152 It
is unclear whether these provisions are congruent with the Bayh-Dole Act,153
as they seem primarily aimed at undoing the holding in American Society for
Metals v. Limbach,154 where the Ohio Supreme Court had strictly applied a
profit test to deny exemption to a scientific membership society with ongoing
net positive income from publications, conferences, and lectures.155
Pennsylvania places high statutory and constitutional barriers to tax
exemption.156 The state constitution limits exemptions to only “[i]nstitutions
of purely public charity, but in the case of any real property tax exemptions
only that portion of real property of such institution which is actually and
regularly used for the purposes of the institution.”157 Academic property
should fall within these general bounds.158 Pennsylvania courts apply a fivepart test, which has been codified,159 to an organization claiming an
exemption:
(1) it must advance a charitable purpose; (2) it must donate or render
gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; (3) it must benefit a
substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of
charity; (4) it must relieve the government of some of its burden; and (5) it
must operate entirely free from private profit motive.160

148. See Ohio N. Univ. v. Tax Comm’r, 255 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970).
149. See Bowers v. Akron City Hosp., 243 N.E.2d 95, 97 (Ohio 1968) (exempting hospital
parking lot with positive revenue where fees ensured patients and doctors rather than the public
could use it).
150. See Girl Scouts-Great Trail Council v. Levin, 862 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ohio 2007).
151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.12(D)(1) (West 2017).
152. Id. This special provision is also tied to an exit tax on such property when sold to a
nonexempt entity. See id. § 5709.12(D)(2).
153. See infra Parts I.C, II.
154. 569 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio 1991).
155. Id. at 1067.
156. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 13–14.
157. See PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
158. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 4.
159. See Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act of 1997, 10 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 371–385 (West 2016).
160. Fayette Res., Inc. v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 107 A.3d 839, 845 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2014).
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This is a high bar, yet the test distinguishes between reinvested surpluses
and money flowing to private individuals.161 The courts acknowledge that
“tax-exempt charitable institutions will have revenue, including surplus
revenue, but . . . it is how such revenue is used that will determine whether it
evidences a private profit motive.”162
In City of Washington v. Board of Assessment Appeals,163 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a nonprofit college had satisfied
the profit prong as it neither compensated trustees nor distributed any profits
or dividends to any individuals.164 The school’s finances also showed that it
provided education below cost.165 The test’s codification carved out “staterelated universities”166 but left other colleges subject to its burdens. Many
nonprofits make PILOTs to satisfy it.167
Minnesota applies a six-part test, looking at the nonprofit corporation’s
purpose, its reliance on donations, and charging of fees, as well as the
presence of profits to the organization, an open class of beneficiaries
reasonably related to the charitable purposes, and distributions to private
entities of any material dividends or profits either during the undertaking or
on dissolution.168 This test was set forth in North Star Research Institute v.
County of Hennepin,169 which predates the Bayh-Dole Act and deals directly
with scientific research and external partnerships between nonprofits and forprofit companies. In North Star, the Minnesota Supreme Court focused on
the fact that a research institute gave marketplace advantages and proprietary
interests in subsequent patents to private businesses.170 Furthermore, the
organization could not demonstrate that these agreements covered an
insubstantial fraction of the research.171 The court denied the property-tax
exemption.172
Although a recent case clarified that the North Star factors are not a
multiprong test,173 the same case also denied property-tax exemptions to
charitable organizations that charge fees.174 In North Star, the court did not
examine the test factors closely as the case represented a departure from thenstandard charitable practice.175 Instead, the court distinguished between
161. See id. at 846; In re Dunwoody Vill., 52 A.3d 408, 422–23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)
(denying exemption where retirement community executives received annual bonuses for
financial performance).
162. Wilson Area Sch. Dist. v. Easton Hosp., 747 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. 2000).
163. 704 A.2d 120 (Pa. 1997).
164. Id. at 125–26.
165. Id.
166. See 10 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 374 (West 2016).
167. See Pamela Leland, PILOTs: The Large City Experience, in PROPERTY-TAX
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 193, 195.
168. See N. Star Research Inst. v. County of Hennepin, 236 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1975).
169. 236 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1975).
170. Id. at 755.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Under the Rainbow Child Care Ctr., Inc. v. County of Goodhue, 741 N.W.2d 880,
885 (Minn. 2007) (noting that “North Star did not establish six mandatory elements”).
174. See id. at 886.
175. See N. Star, 236 N.W.2d at 757.
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indirect economic benefits to society from increased innovation and direct
public benefits from fostering and making abstract knowledge publicly
available.176 Furthermore, it saw creating competitive advantages for outside
partners as stretching the concept of a charitable purpose beyond the breaking
point.177
C. The Bayh-Dole Act Complicates This Framework
State property-tax exemptions with profit tests would be more restrictive
than federal regulation of business activities by nonprofits, particularly in the
academic context, if strictly enforced. Many state-level property-exemption
statutes seem out of sync with the modern “knowledge economy,”178 where
research universities develop key innovations that drive American economic
growth.179 Much of this shift is traceable to the 1980 adoption of a federal
law to accelerate commercializing such research.180 The fact that so many
of these profit tests were established in case law before Bayh-Dole activities
became such a significant part of the economy indicates that this is an area
of law that deserves reevaluation.
The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act,181 better known
as the Bayh-Dole Act, was intended “to promote collaboration between
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; . . .
[and] to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions
made in the United States . . . .”182 The law gave universities a green light to
exploit patents invented by faculty and staff, to remit a portion of the
proceeds as royalties to the inventors, and to license the patents to small
businesses.183
The Act’s required royalties resemble a share of profits that would
otherwise violate the nondistribution constraint, while the preference for
small businesses similarly appears to convey private benefits on those
176. See id. at 757–58.
177. See id. at 758.
178. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE KNOWLEDGEBASED
ECONOMY
(1996),
https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/1913021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S79A-H5EJ]; Walter W. Powell & Kaisa Snellman, The Knowledge
Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 199 (2004).
179. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, Universities as Innovation Drivers, in BEST
PRACTICES IN STATE AND REGIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVES: COMPETING IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 49 (Charles W. Wessner ed., 2013); see also Hansmann, supra note 16, at 835 n.1;
Christopher M. Kelly, Book Note, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 521, 522–23, 527–28 (1995)
(reviewing ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994)). But see Powell & Snellman, supra note 178, at
204–06, 214–16 (noting that this pattern correlates with weak labor productivity and uneven
growth).
180. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. in
Support of Stanford’s Petition for Certiorari at 1, 8–9, Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (No. 09-1159).
181. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012).
182. Id. § 200 (emphasis added).
183. See id. § 207(c)(7) (providing “a requirement that the contractor share royalties with
the inventor” and a requirement that “a preference in the licensing of subject inventions shall
be given to small business firms”).
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organizations.184 Yet, as the U.S. Supreme Court clarified in Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems,
Inc.,185 Bayh-Dole does not mandate such activities but rather authorizes
them with guidelines and restrictions tied to federal funds.186 In another case,
a federal district court held that the law was not intended to precisely regulate
the relationship between universities and faculty inventors.187 Although the
regulations impose standard contract clauses as the general norm,188 it is well
established that the royalty requirement does not set a minimum rate of
disbursement.189 It is not clear, however, whether the elective nature of
Bayh-Dole implicates some proportionality test for nonprofits vis-à-vis either
the extent of other exempt purposes or the size of private benefits conferred
to for-profit businesses.190
The Bayh-Dole Act succeeded in spurring the changes it sought. One
study found annual patents granted to universities expanded from 380 in 1980
to 3088 in 2009.191 The Association of University Technology Managers,
founded in 1974, now counts over three thousand members.192 Economists
estimate the law’s positive impact in the tens of billions of dollars.193 Still,
critics charge that these benefits have concentrated in relatively few hands,
accruing primarily to corporate shareholders, patent holders, and university
endowments.194

184. See id. Other federal statutes also incentivize partnerships between nonprofits and
for-profit businesses. See, e.g., Bradley Myers, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A
Proposal to Address IRS Concerns Regarding Partnerships Between Non-Profit and ForProfit Entities, 60 TAX LAW. 415, 415 (2007).
185. 563 U.S. 776 (2011).
186. Id. at 787; see also Christopher S. Hayter & Jacob H. Rooksby, A Legal Perspective
on University Technology Transfer, 41 J. TECH. TRANSFER 270, 279 (2016).
187. See Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 133, 141–42 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 184 F.
App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2006).
188. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.3 (2017).
189. See Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 787 F. Supp. 360, 367–68
(S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 983 F.2d 1086 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
190. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(3) (2012) (requiring federal agencies to license only federally
owned inventions through transactions in the public interest); see also Colombo, supra note
27, at 1066 (arguing private benefit should be curtailed where “the charity enters into a
transaction with a for-profit entity . . . involving [the charity’s] core services that confers a
competitive advantage on the for-profit in its own business activities”).
191. See Howard Markel, Patents, Profits, and the American People—The Bayh–Dole Act
of 1980, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 794, 794 (2013); see also Hayter & Rooksby, supra note 186,
at 271 (discussing trends).
192. See About AUTM, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, http://www.autm.net/autm-info/aboutautm/ [https://perma.cc/8MQE-JCBX] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
193. See Markel, supra note 191, at 794.
194. See JACOB H. ROOKSBY, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW UNIVERSITIES
CAPTURE, MANAGE, AND MONETIZE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND WHY IT MATTERS 9, 132–
43, 151 (2016). See generally Amy Kapczynski, Addressing Global Health Inequalities: An
Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005);
Rachael A. Ream, Nonprofit Commercialization Under Bayh-Dole and the Academic
Anticommons, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1343 (2008).
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1. Bayh-Dole Activities Can Fit Within the Federal Exemption
Is the Bayh-Dole framework a rational exception from the overall legal
system guiding nonprofit activities? The Bayh-Dole Act seems to discount
the possibility that it might conflict with the tax code. It takes precedence
over other laws, yet omits § 501(c)(3) from a long list of affected statutes.195
It does contemplate interaction between the two, however, as its definition
for “nonprofit organization” includes organizations tax exempt under
§ 501(c)(3).196 Yet its definition is broader than a reference to that section,
which indicates that the meaning of this term is not controlled by the tax code.
The overall goals of the Bayh-Dole Act are tied to ideas of public benefit.
It incentivizes research useful to society but also encourages it to occur at
nonprofits, where researchers may be more likely to pursue foundational
inquiries and engage in teaching. Furthermore, the prior system was
criticized for wasting valuable publicly funded innovations.197
The current federal tax law presents no real conflict with Bayh-Dole. The
framework of intermediate sanctions for excess-benefit transactions coupled
with UBIT can accommodate the likely collaborations. Income from
partnerships can be structured as passive investment income, income
substantially related to a university or research institute’s exempt
purposes,198 or UBIT.199 Many faculty inventors likely have royalty
agreements covered by the initial contract exception to excess benefit
transactions.200 Others will not even be disqualified persons under the law if
they do not run departments or laboratories or exercise significant control of
the organization.201
The remaining question is whether other private benefits to outsiders and
nondisqualified employees should be considered necessary byproducts of the
modern scientific research institution.202 The intent of the Bayh-Dole Act to
foster such efforts reveals no great qualms on the issue, and IRS policy
decisions reflect this.203 Even if the collaborative structures for licensing
patents necessarily create substantial private benefits, this is likely
195. See 35 U.S.C. § 210.
196. See id. § 201(i).
197. See Markel, supra note 191, at 794 (noting estimates that only 5 percent of such
patents reached the market).
198. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (2017); IIT Research Inst. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct.
13, 21 (1985) (construing a research institute’s income from work carried out for industrial
clients as substantially related to its exempt purpose).
199. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5); see also Peter D. Blumberg, Comment,
From “Publish or Perish” to “Profit or Perish”: Revenues from University Technology
Transfer and the § 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89, 93–94 (1996) (arguing
some Bayh-Dole income should be taxable under UBIT).
200. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-01082 (Oct. 10, 1984) (allowing a foundation to create a for-profit subsidiary whose joint-owners
would be researchers recruited via equity shares).
201. See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3 (2017).
202. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987); see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
85-01-082 (Oct. 10, 1984) (construing private benefit to the related for-profit entity as
“entirely incidental to the major purpose and effect of the proposed transaction”).
203. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
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permissible under federal law: internal IRS guidance states that a nonprofit
may create qualitatively incidental private benefits if these are “a necessary
concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity
can be accomplished only by benefiting certain private individuals.”204
The elective nature of the Act—that is, the fact that universities and other
nonprofits are only bound by Bayh-Dole to the extent that they choose to
patent federally funded research205—means that questions of proportionality
may emerge. How much benefit to outside partners or faculty inventors
would be too much? There does not appear to be a single case where a
nonprofit acting in accordance with Bayh-Dole has lost federal tax exemption
on private-benefit grounds. The new excise taxes on high compensation to
key nonprofit employees and on very large university endowments,206
however, show some willingness from Congress and the federal government
to rein in the generation and distribution of wealth in the sector. It is possible
that some border-drawing enforcement could occur.
2. The Federal Nondistribution Constraint
Is Weaker and More Flexible than State Profit Tests
Because the federal framework looks for excess benefit or private
inurement to insiders, or substantial private benefit to outsiders,207 the
required royalty distributions under Bayh-Dole can be structured so that even
significant regular payouts could be permissible.208 Although large annual
remittances may seem like profit sharing to casual observers, the IRS likely
would not agree. The interaction between the Bayh-Dole Act and local
property-tax exemptions is more complicated.

204. Id. For state-level exemptions IRS positions would not control, see, e.g., North Star
Research Institute v. County of Hennepin, 236 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1975) (denying a preBayh-Dole arrangement as only creating remote public benefits while directly allowing “a
person or corporation [to] gain[] a profit or commercial advantage as the immediate and
intended direct consequence of the ‘charity’”).
205. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
206. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §§ 13602, 13701, 131 Stat.
2054 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4960); see also Ray Gronberg, Congress Throws Flag on Duke
for Paying Krzyzewski and Cutcliffe as Much as It Does, HERALD SUN (Dec. 26, 2017, 6:00
AM), http://www.heraldsun.com/news/local/counties/durham-county/article191416419.html
[https://perma.cc/NT86-XGBX]; Jamie D. Halper, Harvard to Pay “Unprecedented”
Endowment Tax, CRIMSON (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/12/20/
endowment-tax-passed/ [https://perma.cc/7982-DHPC]; Ben Myers & Brock Read, If
Republicans Get Their Way, These Colleges Would See Their Endowments Taxed, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 5, 2017, 11:31 AM), https://www.chronicle.com/article/If-RepublicansGet-Their-Way/241659 [https://perma.cc/V42X-27A4] (tabulating schools affected, with
Princeton at the top); Jake Novak, How Tax Reform Will End the Nonprofit Executive Pay
Scam, CNBC (Dec. 20, 2017, 2:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/20/tax-reformsmacks-down-excessive-nonprofit-executive-pay-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/46GW4NXN]; Dan Spinelli, Under the Final GOP Tax Plan, Penn Will Pay a Landmark Excise Tax
on Its Endowment, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Dec. 22, 2017, 12:44 AM),
http://www.thedp.com/article/2017/12/republican-tax-plan-trump-upenn-graduate-studentsendowment-gutmann [https://perma.cc/LAU2-2YA6].
207. See supra notes 27–30, 67 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 30, 92–94, 200–02 and accompanying text.
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The substance of the complaint in Fields targeted the university’s
commercial incomes, particularly its patents and licenses, examining
revenues and alleged profit sharing with both the faculty whose research
produced the patents as well as outside corporate partners.209 The plaintiffs
alleged that the university received over $500 million in such revenue over
nine years210 and shared over $100 million of it with faculty211 in a way that
would seem to violate the “nondistribution constraint” applied by state
law.212 They also alleged that the university made its research facilities
available to private corporations through rental agreements, licensing
agreements, and joint ventures.213
For the purpose of evaluating a property-tax exemption, should it matter
that a university structures hiring, retention, and resource investment around
financially beneficial patent-development systems?214 Or should the key
considerations be the size of the royalty compensations to inventors?215
Should a court consider the direct use of shared facilities by joint ventures?216
Or should it focus on the ability of outside partners in joint ventures to benefit
from the research use of laboratories and other facilities by the university’s
own employees?217 As there do not seem to be directly related property-tax
exemption cases decided on the merits since the enactment of Bayh-Dole,218
it is difficult to say what standards should apply. Yet it appears that
nonprofits engaging in significant Bayh-Dole activities could forfeit
property-tax exemptions if statutory profit tests were strictly enforced as
barriers to employees or outside partners making a substantial profitable use
of an otherwise exempt property.
II. THE POLICY CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND STATE PROFIT TESTS
This Part focuses on whether there is a legal conflict between the BayhDole Act and profit tests applied to state-level charitable and educational
property-tax exemptions. Part II.A explains that Bayh-Dole should not be
209. See 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at 2–12; see also Ollwerther, supra note 3.
210. See Complaint at 3, Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574 (2015) (No.
7556-15) [hereinafter 2015 Complaint]; Young, supra note 13.
211. See 2015 Complaint, supra note 210, at 3; see also Anna Merriman, 24 More Residents
Challenge Princeton U.’s Tax Exempt Status, NJ.COM (Apr. 6, 2016, 4:29 PM),
http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2016/04/24_more_residents_challenge_princeton_us_ta
x_exemp.html [https://perma.cc/L4TH-5TPP]; Ollwerther, supra note 3.
212. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2017); Hansmann, supra note 31, at 501.
213. See 2015 Complaint, supra note 210, at 2.
214. See Janet Rae-Dupree, When Academia Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
6,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/technology/07unbox.html
[https://perma.cc/9VNW-Z7N3]; see, e.g., Office of Technology Licensing, PRINCETON U.
(May 16, 2017), https://www.princeton.edu/patents/ [https://perma.cc/F3GA-KBFV]
(providing an overview of Princeton University’s patenting and licensing efforts).
215. See 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at 3–5; cf. Manny, supra note 67, at 747–50.
216. See supra notes 123–30 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 99–103, 113–14 and accompanying text.
218. American Society for Metals v. Limbach dealt with revenue from conferences,
lectures, and publications, rather than patents. See Am. Soc’y for Metals v. Limbach, 569
N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ohio 1991); supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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construed as preempting state-level laws on educational and charitable
property-tax exemptions and argues that although patent regulations are
reserved to federal law, local property tax exemptions are independent
expressions of state sovereignty.
Part II.B then clarifies that dormant Commerce Clause concerns should not
act as a bar to the persistence of these two disparate systems. Part II.C warns,
however, that there are strong policy arguments in favor of greater alignment
between federal and state-level tax exemptions and that there are negative
practical consequences of nonalignment.
A. The Bayh-Dole Act Should Not
Preempt Local Property-Tax Exemptions
Although there is a great deal of tension between the aims of the BayhDole Act and state-imposed restrictions on the revenue-generating activities
of nonprofits, there is likely no legal conflict between these two systems of
incentives and regulations. The following Part addresses the question of
express and implied preemption over state law. Part II.A.1 concludes that
there is no express preemption, while Part II.A.2 presents reasons why there
should be no implied preemption.
1. There Is No Express Preemption
The Bayh-Dole Act does not expressly preempt state tax-exemption laws,
although it may preempt state nonprofit incorporation laws. The Bayh-Dole
Act specifically contemplates the nature of nonprofit corporations as
creatures of state law. It defines “nonprofit organization” to include
“universities and other institutions of higher education or an organization of
the type described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code . . . or
any nonprofit scientific or educational organization qualified under a State
nonprofit organization statute.”219 This definition could be seen to defer to
state law qualifications for such organizations, or rather to preempt those
rules to the extent that they might clash with Bayh-Dole. On the one hand,
Congress clearly meant to set a national policy for all such organizations, and
it is fairly clear that Congress intended that an otherwise qualified nonprofit
should not lose its nonprofit status due to its engagement in Bayh-Dole
activities. On the other hand, however, federal nonprofit status does not
create a general entitlement to property-tax exemptions at the state level, and
Congress made no mention of state-based tax exemptions in Bayh-Dole.
2. There Is Likely No Implied Preemption
The next steps in preemption analysis involve examining whether state law
might have been implicitly displaced by Congress.220 Such preemption can
219. 35 U.S.C. § 201(i) (2012).
220. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (finding implicit
preemption when a federal law’s scope “indicates that Congress intended [it] to occupy a field
exclusively,” or when “state law is in actual conflict” with it, or “where it is ‘impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements,’ . . . or where state law
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occur when the state law intrudes on a field that is reserved for Congress or
which Congress has occupied.221 Implied preemption may also occur if the
state law directly conflicts with or frustrates the federal law.222 Congress has
the power to shape and encourage particular economic activities.223
Deference would seem to be all the more warranted here as patents are
reserved to federal law under the Progress of Science and Useful Arts
Clause.224 Nonetheless, as taxation is a strong expression of state
sovereignty,225 it is a stretch to say that federal patent law should necessarily
preempt state tax-exemption law.
Furthermore, even though there is tension between Bayh-Dole and state
property-tax exemptions, it is clear that the latter do not directly regulate the
same subject or field as Bayh-Dole.226 Courts resolving disputes tied to the
Bayh-Dole Act or patents have refused to dismiss state-law claims. One
district court noted that “states are not precluded from enforcing
complementary laws that may involve patent issues.”227 It quoted Aronson
v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,228 where the Supreme Court held “[s]tate law is
not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property
which may or may not be patentable . . . .”229 Because these state propertytax exemptions, which determine an organization’s tax liability to a local
sovereign, do not clearly intrude into the regulation of intellectual property,
they need not be preempted, despite Bayh-Dole’s reference to state-level notfor-profit corporation statutes.
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.’” (citation omitted) (first quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79
(1990); then quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
221. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401, 403 (2012) (denying Arizona
any authority to establish immigration laws that it argued were complementary to federal
immigration law).
222. See id. at 399–400.
223. It can do so under either the Commerce Clause or through its spending power.
Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (approving the regulation of home-grown
marijuana as an economic activity), with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)
(“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds . . . .”).
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1
(2002). But see generally Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External
Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329 (2012) (arguing that this clause limits congressional power).
225. Compare Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 311 (1997) (“Indeed, ‘in taxation,
even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.’”
(quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))), with Princeton Univ. Press v.
Borough of Princeton, 172 A.2d 420, 422 (N.J. 1961) (“[O]rdinarily all property shall bear its
just and equal share of the public burden of taxation. As the existence of government is a
necessity, taxes are demanded and received in order for government to function.” (citations
omitted)).
226. Cf. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 402 (2012) (“[T]he basic premise of field
preemption—[is] that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Government
has reserved for itself.”). The federal government has never attempted to reserve local
property taxation for itself.
227. Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 133, 141 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 184 F. App’x
21 (2d Cir. 2006).
228. 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
229. Id.
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Preemption may also be implied through the nature of the conflict between
the laws in question. If the state law makes it impossible for a person or
corporation to comply with both the state and federal law, the state law will
be preempted.230 Similarly, if a state’s legal scheme is so at odds with the
federal one that it fundamentally frustrates the federal purpose, the state laws
will be preempted.231 Here, it would be possible for a university or research
institute to rigorously engage in Bayh-Dole activities while complying with
state laws even in a state with a very strict “profit test” as long as it is willing
to forgo property-tax exemption. It could still retain federal income-tax
exemption as well as other benefits of nonprofit status. Furthermore,
although the Constitution bars state interference with patent regulation, so far
there is insufficient evidence that incidence of real property taxes on
universities and research institutes would necessarily frustrate Congress’s
goals for Bayh-Dole.232 Indeed, the recent endowment excise tax may
indicate that some additional incidence of tax on universities with large
revenues should not be construed as frustrating Congress’s purpose of
promoting the commercialization of patentable research.233
Thus, the apparent conflict between Bayh-Dole and state-level profit tests
can be resolved by distinguishing between laws governing state-level
incorporation from those governing property tax. Because the latter are
independent, Bayh-Dole’s definitional reference to nonprofit corporate status
need not encompass them.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Concerns
Do Not Invalidate These State Laws
Dormant Commerce Clause concerns also do not present a legal barrier to
the persistence of the tension between the federal and state-level regimes,
although they do have a persuasive role. Exemptions, including property-tax
exemptions, can violate the dormant Commerce Clause.234 If exemptions
merely encourage domestic industry, they generally survive under the
“legitimate local interest” standard unless conditioned on further

230. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399–400.
231. See id.
232. But see Abhiroop Mukherjee, Manpreet Singh & Alminas Žaldokas, Do Corporate
Taxes Hinder Innovation?, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 195–96 (2017) (examining the effects of
increases in state corporate tax rates on the patenting and research activity of for-profit
corporations).
233. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. It is worth noting, however, that
subsequent legislation is disfavored as a guide to Congress’s original purpose for any statutory
scheme still in effect. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310 (1960) (explaining
in this taxpayer dispute that “subsequent legislative developments [do not] change the view
we have of the statute”). The Court also warned that “the views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” Id. at 313.
234. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574 (1997)
(striking an exemption limited to nonprofits serving Maine residents and stating that “[a] tax
on real estate, like any other tax, may impermissibly burden interstate commerce” and that
“the States may [not] impose real estate taxes in a manner that discriminates against interstate
commerce”).
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discrimination against interstate commerce or consumers.235 Still, even
seemingly neutral statutes may not create disproportionate burdens on
interstate commerce.236 As with preemption, there is as yet insufficient
evidence that profit tests on real property tax exemptions create such burdens.
C. Practical Considerations Argue Against Nonalignment
There are strong policy arguments in favor of greater alignment between
federal and state-level tax exemptions. When a certain way of doing business
is encouraged by Congress, is widespread across the entire sector and nation,
and plays a significant role in defining the modern university, it deserves
acknowledgment at the state and local levels. Universities compete for top
talent across state lines and international borders. Their ability to do so is an
economic engine for municipalities, regions, and nations.237
Whether such patent commercialization activities should be encouraged,
forbidden, or permitted subject to partial taxation is a large policy question
rather than a narrow issue of statutory interpretation. The Bayh-Dole Act
was a dramatic change when introduced.238 Since then, it has been
heralded239 and criticized240 for its effects on academia and the broader
economy. Skeptics, including a former president of Harvard,241 worry that
commercialization of academia has a corrosive effect on higher education.242
Critics point to low pay for adjunct faculty243 and graduate-student

235. Compare Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 385 (1991) (noting
that tax incentives stimulate growth), and Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 747–
48 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing exemption cases), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006), with Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553
U.S. 328, 338–39 (2008) (stating the more general rule). Cuno also demonstrates federal
standing hurdles facing taxpayer suits. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Putting State
Courts in the Constitutional Driver’s Seat: State Taxpayer Standing After Cuno and Winn,
40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2012).
236. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (providing the doctrinal
test).
237. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 179, at 49–54; Adams, supra note 14,
at 572–73.
238. See Michael Sweeney, Comment, Correcting Bayh-Dole’s Inefficiencies for the
Taxpayer, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 295, 296 (2012); Opinion, Innovation’s Golden
Goose, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/1476653
[https://perma.cc/FL7E-JBYY].
239. See Opinion, supra note 238.
240. See ROOKSBY, supra note 194, at 142–44, 175; JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY,
INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 148–52 (2005);
Sweeney, supra note 238, at 296–97.
241. See Blumberg, supra note 199, at 91. See generally Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing
of Higher Education: The Price of the University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763 (2004)
(reviewing DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION (2003)).
242. See generally WASHBURN, supra note 240.
243. See, e.g., Kim Clark, Does It Matter That Your Professor Is Part Time?, U.S. NEWS
(Nov. 7, 2008, 4:46 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2008/11/07/does-itmatter-that-your-professor-is-part-time [https://perma.cc/AB4Z-VPA7]; Kate Guarino,
Adjunct Faculty Seek to Unionize, DAILY TROJAN (Apr. 15, 2015), http://dailytrojan.com/onthe-money/#tab-id-3 [https://perma.cc/T3VQ-LMM2].

2058

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

instructors,244 high student debts,245 and profit-oriented research246 as
outcomes of commercialization. Such concerns have spurred campaigns for
labor rights on campus,247 increased regulation of for-profit colleges,248 and
the new excises taxes on very large university endowments249 as well as on
individual compensation to nonprofit employees who earn more than $1
million a year.250 Elite nonprofit universities face pressure from a society
uncertain about the public benefits they create. The fact that they gain
support not only from tax exemptions but also from direct public funding via
research grants and tuition support heightens the pressure.251
Academic commercialization, though exacerbated by Bayh-Dole, cannot
be traced solely to it. Commercialization is widespread not only in academia
but also throughout the nonprofit sector.252 Some scholars see benefits to
blurring boundaries between for-profits and nonprofits,253 but others are
concerned that current law already drifts far from an understanding of
charitable efforts as serving society’s neediest.254
At the same time, there is a long, sporadic history of municipalities
engaging in tax disputes with nonprofits.255 These disputes often emerge at
moments of social tension and upheaval.256 Still, municipalities may be loath
to challenge a local tax-exempt golden goose, especially if they have already
244. See, e.g., Avi Asher-Schapiro, NYU’s Graduate Student Union Just Won a Historic
Contract, NATION (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/nyus-graduate-studentunion-just-won-historic-contract/ [https://perma.cc/KN2U-X8PX]; Jennifer Klein, Opinion,
Why Yale Graduate Students Are on a Hunger Strike, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/opinion/why-yale-graduate-students-are-on-a-hungerstrike.html [https://perma.cc/3VVG-RCZT].
245. See, e.g., Editorial, Student Debt’s Grip on the Economy, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/opinion/sunday/student-debts-economy-loans.html
[https://perma.cc/V6P9-4CGE].
246. See Blumberg, supra note 199, at 91; Sweeney, supra note 238, at 301–03.
247. See supra notes 243–44.
248. See, e.g., Editorial, Protecting Students from Bad Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (June 20,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/20/opinion/protecting-students-from-badcolleges.html [https://perma.cc/C5PC-7XNT].
249. See supra note 206.
250. See supra note 206; see also Andrea Fuller, Charity Officials Are Increasingly
Receiving Million-Dollar Paydays, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2017, 9:59 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/charity-officials-are-increasingly-receiving-million-dollarpaydays-1488754532 [https://perma.cc/K6PA-3SZC].
251. See Christopher S. Hayter, Public or Private Entrepreneurship? Revisiting
Motivations and Definitions of Success Among Academic Entrepreneurs, 40 J. TECH.
TRANSFER 1003, 1004 (2015); Press Release, Am. Insts. for Research, Taxpayer Subsidies for
Most Colleges and Universities Average Between $8,000 to More than $100,000 for Each
Bachelor’s Degree, New Study Finds (May 12, 2011), http://www.air.org/news/pressrelease/taxpayer-subsidies-most-colleges-and-universities-average-between-8000-more
[https://perma.cc/X5LE-JSCM].
252. See generally TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (Burton Weisbrod ed., 1998).
253. See Tahk, supra note 11, at 506.
254. See Kelley, supra note 21, at 2490–93 (proposing that charities specifically serving
the poor should be given further preferential legal status).
255. See Evelyn Brody, Introduction to PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra
note 19, at ix, ix–xi.
256. See id.
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negotiated a PILOT with it.257 Because assessments are often local, this can
result in inequitable enforcement. Mid-size nonprofits may face strictly
enforced profit tests that larger nonprofits have been able to ignore.258
Meanwhile, the latter may face PILOT demands that look increasingly like
property taxes. Although this discretion is arguably appropriate in the
context of municipal competition in tax rates and services,259 as currently
practiced, nonprofits face an uncertain and incoherent enforcement
landscape. Greater alignment between local and federal policy would reduce
the regulatory compliance burden for nonprofits.260 Reshaping the border
between for-profits and nonprofits through legislation also offers a chance to
redesign incentives for creating public goods and benefits.261
III. ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION
This Part examines various attempts to address the dilemmas posed by the
local burdens and impacts of wealthy nonprofits as well as attempts to
reconcile the disparities between federal and state laws regulating the sector.
Part III.A focuses on the Fields litigation as a model for laissez-faire
enforcement of state-level regulation, while Part III.B examines reforms in a
number of states that have sought to bring rules governing charitable and
educational exemptions from ad valorem property taxes closer to the rules
governing the federal income-tax exemption.
Most property-tax exemption statutes were drafted well before the
twentieth-century expansion of academia or the Bayh-Dole Act. New laws
at the state level could resolve substantial disconnections between state and
federal regulation of nonprofits. Some state legislatures are starting to
address these issues; the Fields case indicates that they should move more
rapidly towards thoroughgoing reform.
A. The Fields Litigation Is a Fraught Model for Citizen Enforcement
Fields can be seen as a test of whether local taxpayers can participate in
oversight of entities with significant power in their communities. Under the
current framework, there are barriers to oversight by public actors. The IRS
is unlikely to challenge universities for their patent activities given the clear
intent of the Bayh-Dole Act and its own past practice.262 State attorneys
general enforce nonprofit corporation laws regarding fiduciary duties of

257. See, e.g., supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
258. See generally Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 53 (discussing the application of
the Tiebout model to tax rates).
259. See generally id.
260. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The 21st Century Fight over Who Sets the Terms of the
Charity Property Tax Exemption, 77 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 259, 259 (2016) (describing the
current property tax-exemption landscape as “a multilevel framework for mischief lead[ing]
to legal incoherence”).
261. See Tahk, supra note 11, at 494; see also Dagher, supra note 27, at 3481 (discussing
why social impact bonds, an innovation in nonprofit financing, may not be tax exempt).
262. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
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boards and protect charitable assets;263 they do not interfere in local tax
disputes. Municipalities, meanwhile, have both incentives and disincentives
to challenge exemptions.264
If the litigation model used in Fields becomes widespread, it could
transform the nonprofit landscape. In a drafted amicus brief to a denied
appeal during the case, New Jersey’s Center for Non-Profit Corporations, an
umbrella organization for the state’s thirty-thousand nonprofit entities,
argued that a loss for the defendants could damage the entire sector.265 While
expanding this model could give an oversight voice to citizens often excluded
from municipal power, it could also put nonprofits at risk of repeated suits
by opportunists and have a chilling effect on nonprofits engaged in
controversial public services.266 To understand why Fields has the potential
to change the landscape of nonprofit oversight, it is helpful to understand the
outcome of the case as well as the broader relationship between Princeton
University and its surrounding community. Part III.A.1 sketches the social
context for this exemption challenge, while Part III.A.2 closely examines the
standing model that the plaintiffs employed.
1. The Social Context for Fields
The first iteration of the Fields suit began after a controversial municipal
reassessment in 2010 that was deemed valid by a local commission in
2011.267 This reassessment significantly increased many property valuations
and related tax bills.268 When Fields settled in October 2016,269 the number
of plaintiffs had increased more than sixfold.270 Among these was Shirley
Satterfield, a prominent local citizen who grew up in Princeton, worked at
the public high school, and served on the boards of the historical society and
a group dedicated to fighting local racial prejudice.271 She joined the suit
263. See,
e.g.,
About
the
Charities
Bureau,
CHARITIES
NYS.COM,
https://www.charitiesnys.com/about_new.html [https://perma.cc/NHW7-77R3] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2018).
264. See supra notes 255–59 and accompanying text.
265. See Motion for Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae of Center for Non-Profit
Corporations, Inc. et al., at 5, Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. AM185-15 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.njnonprofits.org/12072015Amici_sMotion
ForLeaveToAppearAsAmiciCuriae.PDF [https://perma.cc/4PSY-ZAY6].
266. See id. at 6.
267. See Krystal Knapp, Panel Finds Princeton Property Tax Revaluation Is Accurate,
Despite Flaws, NJ.COM (Apr. 4, 2011, 9:39 AM), http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/
2011/04/panel_2010_princeton_property.html [https://perma.cc/9VD2-FDJL].
268. See id. (noting that tax bills doubled for some residents).
269. See Office of Commc’ns, Princeton to Assist Lower-Income Homeowners Under Tax
Litigation Settlement, PRINCETON U. (Oct. 14, 2016, 4:55 PM), http://www.princeton.edu/
main/news/archive/S47/64/64E38/ [https://perma.cc/2838-EUBS].
270. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Compare 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at
1 (listing plaintiffs), with 2011 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1 (listing plaintiffs).
271. See 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at 1; Jean Stratton, Princeton Resident Shirley
Satterfield Is a Concerned and Committed Citizen, TOWN TOPICS (Mar. 7, 2007),
http://www.towntopics.com/mar0707/stratton.html [https://perma.cc/L47F-ZBZ8]; see also
Shirley Satterfield, Letter to the Editor, Princeton’s African American Community Should Be
Remembered Every Month, TOWN TOPICS (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.towntopics.com/
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along with roughly two dozen plaintiffs who primarily resided in a
historically African American neighborhood known as WitherspoonJackson, where she grew up.272 This neighborhood has residents whose
grandparents and great-grandparents were displaced from a central district,
now known as Palmer Square, during a redevelopment initiative around 1930
aimed at improving the prestige of the University.273 That project ejected
African Americans from the municipal center, which intensified residential
segregation in Princeton.274 The Witherspoon-Jackson neighborhood was
particularly affected by the 2010 revaluation.275 Neighborhood residents
argue that gentrification is pushing them out of this historic community.276
The commission noted the large proportion of exempt properties and
recommended the review of exemptions.277
These pocketbook concerns for affordability and community diversity
drove the litigation.278 One analysis estimated that in-court victory for the
plaintiffs could have reduced the average property-tax burden in Princeton
from about $17,700 per year to roughly $11,800.279 Such concrete financial
impact is due in part to Princeton University’s significant wealth, which
includes substantial local real property. As of 2014, Princeton University

wordpress/2015/03/18/princetons-african-american-community-should-be-rememberedevery-month/ [https://perma.cc/6VAA-3WFA].
272. See Merriman, supra note 211; Hannah Waxman, 23 Town Residents Join TaxExemption Lawsuit Against U., DAILY PRINCETONIAN (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://dailyprincetonian.com/news/2016/04/23-town-residents-join-tax-exemption-lawsuitagainst-u/ [https://perma.cc/9ZEQ-ZTL7].
273. See WISE PRES. PLANNING LLC, SURVEY AND DISTRICT EVALUATION, WITHERSPOONJACKSON COMMUNITY 55–57 (2015), http://www.princetonnj.gov/HP/wj-survey-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQB8-V79G].
274. See id.
275. See Knapp, supra note 267. The settlement took notice of this area’s needs and set
aside funds to support housing affordability there. See Office of Commc’ns, supra note 269.
276. See, e.g., Philip Sean Curran, Witherspoon-Jackson Neighborhood Wants to Maintain
Its Heritage, Diversity and Affordability, CENTRALJERSEY.COM (Aug. 17, 2015),
http://www.centraljersey.com/news/article_efc9c7d2-43ae-11e5-ba16-7bf7495b34fe.html
[https://perma.cc/2YLK-YX6X]; Krystal Knapp, Residents Voice Support, Concerns About
Witherspoon-Jackson Historic District, PLANETPRINCETON.COM (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://planetprinceton.com/2015/12/04/witherspoon-historic-district-debate/
[https://perma.cc/AG3R-HRT7] (quoting residents discussing friends and family who felt
forced to sell after tax increases).
277. See Knapp, supra note 267 (noting that, in 2011, more than 40 percent of borough
properties and nearly 20 percent of township properties were tax exempt).
278. They were also highlighted in the settlement. See Office of Commc’ns, supra note
269.
279. See Young, supra note 13 (noting the average property tax in Princeton is nearly
double the state’s average, which is itself the highest in the nation, and discussing the
combination of taxes, PILOTs, and free and subsidized services the University provides to
local residents); see also Philip Sean Curran, Princeton: Trial on Lawsuit Challenging
University’s Property Tax Exemption Pushed Back to Oct. 17 (Updated),
CENTRALJERSEY.COM (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.centraljersey.com/news/ article_c60fcd028975-11e6-99d0-3f627ac01cae.html [https://perma.cc/6N9R-FSDU] (quoting former
Borough Councilman Roger Martindell’s estimate that bills could drop by a third). But see
Knapp, supra note 2 (calculating a lower average bill based on the estimated burden for a
home with an average assessed value rather than an overall average).
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valued its total net assets at over $21 billion.280 Its physical property includes
about 190 buildings on 500 acres of land.281 That acreage is equivalent to
roughly 4 percent of the current municipality,282 or roughly 42 percent of the
former borough, where most of the University’s real property is located.283
The University engages in its own planning process in developing this
property independent from the municipality’s planning board.284
Not all of the University’s property, however, is located within Princeton;
some of its real estate stretches into two neighboring towns.285 Additionally,
the University holds interests in mortgages and tenancy-in-common
agreements offered to qualifying faculty and staff who purchase newly
acquired homes within nine miles of campus or within the city of Trenton.286
It also has repurchase rights to 160 homes in two Princeton neighborhoods.287
The University employs over 13,000 people, many of whom live in the
surrounding area.288 It has an immense impact on its local economy and
effectively controls much of the real property that surrounds it and on which
it is located.
In terms of its wealth and economic impact on its local community,
Princeton University may be an extreme example. Yet it is not alone. The
nonprofit sector is large;289 its revenues grew almost twice as fast as the rest
280. See Trs. of Princeton Univ., Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax 1 (2014
Form 990), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/download-filing?path=2015_08_EO%
2F21-0634501_990_201406.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR6L-P774].
281. See Facts and Figures, PRINCETON U., https://www.princeton.edu/meetprinceton/facts-figures [https://perma.cc/C8DD-T8F4] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). But see
John De Looper, How Many Buildings Are on Campus?, PRINCETON U. (Apr. 23, 2009),
https://blogs.princeton.edu/mudd/2009/04/how-many-buildings-are-on-campus/
[https://perma.cc/S99U-VXUD] (noting that the number is hard to verify due to construction
as well as buildings with multiple names, departments, and functions).
282. This figure is calculated from statistics given on Wikipedia. See Princeton, New
Jersey,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton,_New_Jersey#cite_noteCensusArea-1 [https://perma.cc/4WS8-3CM2] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
283. This figure is calculated from statistics given on Wikipedia. See Borough of Princeton,
New Jersey, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borough_of_Princeton,_New_Jersey#
Geography [https://perma.cc/6UT2-N8FL] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
284. See, e.g., Princeton Campus Plan: Planning for 2016–2026 and Beyond, PRINCETON
U., http://campusplan.princeton.edu/2026plan [https://perma.cc/GQX3-658L] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2018).
285. See Daniel Day, Office of Commc’ns, University Gives Town Residents, Officials
Update on Development of 2026 Campus Plan, PRINCETON U. (Sept. 20, 2016, 1:15 PM),
http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S47/43/87O32/
[https://perma.cc/DTF68BXH].
286. See Standard Mortgage Program, PRINCETON U, https://hres.princeton.edu/facultystaff/home-ownership-programs/standard-mortgage-program
[https://perma.cc/3MPW4L4Y] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); Tenancy-in-Common Program, PRINCETON U.,
https://hres.princeton.edu/faculty-staff/home-ownership-programs/tenancy-in-commonprogram [https://perma.cc/NW3A-86ZF] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
287. See Princeton Faculty Residential Purchase Plan, PRINCETON U.
https://hres.princeton.edu/faculty-staff/home-ownership-programs/princeton-facultyresidential-purchase-plan [https://perma.cc/5VN4-MER3] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
288. Princeton University’s Form 990 filing for the fiscal year ending June 2014 lists
13,869 employees and 15,000 volunteers. See Trs. of Princeton Univ., supra note 280, at 1.
289. See DAPHNE A. KENYON & ADAM H. LANGLEY, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, THE
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR NONPROFITS AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES 2 (2011),
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of the economy from 1995 to 2010.290 Nonprofit organizations hold
substantial assets, transact complex business, and are key players in local
economies.291 Many municipalities have large nonprofit sectors that occupy
significant proportions of locally assessable land.292
2. The Standing Model Used in Fields
Fields tests whether individual citizens can separately oversee laws
governing nonprofit entities. Importantly, the plaintiffs had not simply
claimed that certain research facilities should be added to the tax roll.
Instead, they argued that the entire institution was sufficiently profit seeking
so that all of its properties would no longer merit exemption.293 The plaintiffs
were thus asserting a large role in enforcing substantive requirements for
property-tax exemption in New Jersey. A key moment in the case was Judge
Bianco’s decision on the burden of proof and standing; he affirmed the
plaintiffs’ right to bring a third-party challenge and confirmed that they
would not bear the burden of proof at trial.294
New Jersey has allowed third-party tax-exemption suits since at least
1941.295 In that year, a former volunteer fireman, suing pro se, challenged
the status of the firehouse where he had volunteered.296 Profit was not at
issue as it was not wholly excluded in the statutory exemption for
firehouses.297 The specific point in that case is now moot,298 but the court’s
holding on the plaintiff’s right to sue remains valid.
In another case from the civil rights era, citizens tried to challenge
property-tax exemptions and liquor licenses of all Elks Lodges in New
Jersey,299 alleging that the organizations’ ban on African Americans and the
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/26756/412460-The-Property-TaxExemption-for-Nonprofits-and-Revenue-Implications-for-Cities.PDF
[https://perma.cc/XLR4-PTQM].
290. See id.
291. See,
e.g.,
Economic
Impact,
NAT’L
COUNCIL
NONPROFITS,
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/economic-impact [https://perma.cc/X6PY-JBT4] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2018).
292. See Brody, supra note 255, at x (noting that this is particularly true in the Northeast).
293. See 2015 Complaint, supra note 210, at 2–11.
294. See Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574, 587 n.11 (2015).
295. See Post v. Warren Point Volunteer Firemen’s Ass’n, 19 A.2d 636, 636 (N.J. B.T.A.
1941) (disagreeing with the defendant’s argument that the statute should not permit an
exemption challenge); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:3-21 (West 2017) (“[A] taxpayer . . .
feeling discriminated against by the assessed valuation of other property in the county . . .
may . . . appeal . . . .”). Because a codicil, § 54:3-21(b), denies this right for one exemption,
and because another New Jersey law, § 54:4-27, clarifies that exemption status is an
assessment, New Jersey courts have held that this language gives taxpayers within the same
county the general right to challenge exemptions.
296. See Post, 19 A.2d at 636; ELAINE B. WINSHELL & JANE LYLE DIEPEVEEN, FAIR LAWN
27 (2001) (reproducing a photograph showing Peter Post among volunteer firemen).
297. See Post, 19 A.2d at 636. The current version of this exemption continues to allow
for a limited form of profit making. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.10.
298. It now follows an actual-use standard rather than an exclusive-use standard. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.10; see also supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
299. See Brunson v. Rutherford Lodge No. 547 of Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks,
319 A.2d 80, 82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (describing the history of the case).

2064

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

state’s beneficial treatment of the organizations violated the state and federal
constitutions. When that case was decided, it had been narrowed to the
county of the plaintiffs’ residence in accordance with New Jersey’s taxpayer
standing law, but the plaintiffs won on the merits.300 These cases
demonstrate that New Jersey law currently provides county-level standing
for third-party exemption challenges.301
Although many states lack laws that so clearly allow such cases, municipal
taxpayers in other jurisdictions may be able to bring similar third-party
exemption challenges. Municipal taxpayers have standing to bring
constitutional challenges to local levies.302 Whether this standing can be
extended to third-party statutory challenges remains to be determined based
on specific legal frameworks in other states.303 Some states, like New Jersey,
incorporate taxpayer standing by statute,304 while in others permissive rules
are judge made.305 Some states only allow such suits if they are particularly
important.306 Both Ohio and Pennsylvania allow for some taxpayer standing
if the underlying issues are of great significance.307
The Minnesota Supreme Court allows even broader taxpayer standing not
only for constitutional claims but also statutory ones. It has held that “a state
or local taxpayer has sufficient interest to challenge illegal expenditures.”308
Although legislative grants of exemption are fiscally equivalent to
expenditures,309 it is possible that states that do permit taxpayer standing may
not extend it to third-party exemption challenges.
The rationale for municipal taxpayer standing in federal courts when
asserting constitutional injuries is that the pocketbook injury to the municipal
taxpayer is palpable and particular, transcending a mere general interest in
the vindication of the law.310 Yet as critics have pointed out, this grants about
8.5 million citizens of New York City more ability to contest a tax than about
300. See id. at 91.
301. For another discussion of this standing model in New Jersey, see David B. Wolfe,
Maria H. Yoo & Douglas M. Allen, When a Stranger Calls: Municipal and Third-Party
Property Tax Appeals, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2017, at 38.
302. See Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood)
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 803 (2003).
303. For example, third-party suits alleging egregious administrative error in exemption
have been possible in New York since 1981. See Dudley v. Kerwick, 421 N.E.2d 797, 800
(N.Y. 1981); Catherine P. Bonnette, Note, Third Party Taxpayer Challenges Under the New
York Real Property Tax Law, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 341, 347 n.18 (1982). Yet in 2000, New
York’s highest court clarified that plaintiffs in exemption suits lack standing where the
property constitutes a minimal proportion of the municipality. See Colella v. Bd. of Assessors,
741 N.E.2d 113, 116 (N.Y. 2000).
304. See Zelinsky, supra note 235, at 42–46.
305. See id. at 36.
306. See id. at 37–39 (discussing standards in Arizona, Alaska, Iowa, and South Carolina
with public importance thresholds).
307. See id. at 39.
308. McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Minn. 1977). Such potential state-level
claims are not abrogated by Bayh-Dole. See infra Part II.A.
309. See Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 TAX L. REV. 617, 620, 629, 644 (2016).
310. See Staudt, supra note 302, at 826, 831–32; cf. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652, 2663 (2013) (denying federal standing to “concerned bystanders . . . vindicat[ing] . . .
value interests” (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986))).
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1.9 million citizens of Nebraska.311 Because the federal standing bars are
generally higher than those in state courts, the existence of federal standing
for municipal taxpayers’ constitutional claims suggests that, where state law
provides no explicit bar, local statutory challenges asserting pocketbook
injuries may be legally cognizable—even as third-party exemption
challenges.
If other citizens take Fields as a model, they could enforce laws intended
to bind nonprofits, even where public actors are unwilling to do so. To
succeed in any challenge, such municipal taxpayers need meritorious claims
that the exemptions are undeserved. In Fields, the main claim was that
Princeton University’s Bayh-Dole activities ran afoul of New Jersey’s limits
on how exempt properties may be used to produce profit.312 The model may
lend itself particularly well to plaintiffs, like the Witherspoon-Jackson
residents, who may share in fewer of the local benefits that an elite institution
provides.313 Because most jurisdictions view exemptions skeptically—
placing burdens of proof on claimants314—litigation modeled after Fields
would force nonprofits to reprove their exemption claims at trial, as in
Fields.315
This balance of power creates strong incentives for settlement. Yet
without a decision on the merits, a challenged organization would not be
protected against the next set of aggrieved taxpayers.316 Nonprofits fear
these dynamics will undermine their financial stability.317 Although few
plaintiffs have made use of this standing model, nonprofits worry it will
become a tool of harassment in the future.318 Proposed legislation in New
Jersey, however, would eliminate this standing.319
B. Legislative Reforms Offer the Best Solutions
Because of current disincentives to oversight, the model of litigation
pioneered in Fields could offer a unique opportunity for citizens to enforce
existing laws governing the nonprofit sector. Underlying problems, however,
often result from conflicting frameworks, rather than just a lack of oversight.
Therefore, such suits do not represent the best means for drawing lines on
nonprofits’ revenue-generating activities. Although the current framework
311. See Neb. Databook, Total Population, NEBRASKA.GOV (Dec. 21, 2017),
http://www.neded.org/files/research/stathand/bsect1.htm [https://perma.cc/PBR2-EUQW].
312. See 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at 2–12; 2015 Complaint, supra note 210, at 3.
313. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 41, at 254, 274–78 (discussing exemptions benefitting small
elites as having redistributive effects contrary to common notions of charity).
314. See supra notes 51, 291 and accompanying text; see also supra note 225 and
accompanying text.
315. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co./Celotex Asbestos Tr., 67 A.3d 587,
596 (N.J. 2013) (upholding New Jersey’s collateral estoppel standard, which bars only claims
fully litigated against a prior party or one in privity where no unfairness to plaintiffs results).
317. See Motion for Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae of Center for Non-Profit
Corporations, Inc. et al., at 5–7, Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. AM185-15 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 7, 2015).
318. See id.
319. See infra Part III.B.1.
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lacks incentives to equitable enforcement, expanding this model of litigation
could have significant negative implications for nonprofits. This Note argues
that enforcing the current boundaries of nonprofit law via citizen lawsuits
would have a less beneficial effect on the sector than thoroughgoing reforms
of those boundaries at the state level. Such reform should focus on better
aligning state and federal law or formalizing PILOTs rather than enacting
procedural barriers to eliminate suits like Fields without addressing
substantive weaknesses in current law.
Part III.B.1 examines the initial statutory response to Fields in New Jersey,
while Part III.B.2 surveys how Connecticut law has approached its large
nonprofit sector. This Note continues its search for workable statutory
schemes in Part III.B.3, which examines proposed legislation in
Massachusetts, and in Part III.B.4, which argues that proposed legislation in
Michigan in 2015 was overly deferential to federal law. Finally, Part III.B.5
concludes that California’s nuanced approach provides a better balance of
interests.
1. Legislative Responses in New Jersey
Recently proposed legislation in New Jersey ignores the key challenge by
sidestepping the tension between state law and the federal policy favoring
research revenues. After Princeton University faced setbacks during motion
practice, a veteran state assemblyman, who had formerly represented the
Borough of Princeton, proposed legislation to prevent all third-party
property-tax challenges.320 His bill was amended shortly before the
settlement to further limit tax-exemption challenges where a PILOT is in
place.321 A state senator incorporated his proposal in a matching bill at the
end of February 2017.322 The bill was passed by the New Jersey State Senate
but not scheduled for a vote in the Assembly before the session expired.323
As this Note discusses, this type of procedural reform is not an ideal solution
to the substantive problems presented by this case. Legislation in other states
offers better models for reform.

320. See Gen. Assemb. 3888, 217th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (as introduced by N.J. Assembly,
June 6, 2016).
321. See Gen. Assemb. 3888, 217th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (as amended and substituted by
N.J. Assembly, Sept. 19, 2016).
322. See S. 2212, 217th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (as amended and substituted by N.J. Senate,
Feb. 27, 2017). The original version contains a statement of the proposed effect. See S. 2212,
217th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (as introduced by N.J. Senate, May 16, 2016) (prohibiting “property
taxpayers from filing property tax appeals with respect to the property of others” and noting
that “under current law, property taxpayers may challenge the assessment or exempt status of
their own property as well as that of any other property in their county”).
323. See
NJ
A3888,
LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/NJ/bill/A3888/2016
[https://perma.cc/46G2-QTE6] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); NJ S2212, LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/NJ/bill/S2212/2016 [https://perma.cc/4EQV-VBPZ] (last visited Feb. 14,
2018).
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2. The Connecticut Model
Connecticut has long been a leader in designing innovative reforms to
regulate nonprofits. Its stated-funded PILOT system, introduced in the
1970s,324 is a better way to balance the statewide interest in flourishing
nonprofits with local impacts on services. Outside Connecticut, exempt
institutions often make PILOTs directly to municipalities on a
pseudovoluntary basis.325 By having the state disburse PILOT payments to
municipalities, the burden of such institutions is spread among a wider
constituency that chooses democratically to support them. Connecticut and
the world may benefit more from Yale than the citizens of New Haven; the
Connecticut model accommodates for this.
Yet even in Connecticut, tensions over nonprofit property tax exemptions
remain. In 2015, the Connecticut House of Representatives passed a bill to
deny new exemptions to properties acquired by colleges and hospitals beyond
their “main campuses.”326 A bill in the state senate would have increased
state funding for PILOT reimbursements to municipalities.327 Though
neither was adopted, both demonstrated not only a legislative will to address
the strain large nonprofits put on municipalities but also that the Connecticut
model itself is stressed by the expansion of wealth within the sector.
3. Standardization of PILOTs in Massachusetts
Legislation to reform PILOTs has been regularly introduced and rejected
in Massachusetts since 2012.328 The most recent bill would permit any
municipality or taxing district to convert ad hoc PILOTs into regularized
required payments at 25 percent of the full tax rate otherwise applicable,
further discounted for a nonprofit’s local services.329 While critics argue that
this is only a lower level of tax for nonprofits, giving municipalities
permission to tax nonprofits at a discount could balance social goals by
acknowledging needs of municipalities as well as the benefits that nonprofits
create. Implementing something similar in most states, however, could
324. See Nicholas R. Carbone & Evelyn Brody, PILOTs: Hartford and Connecticut, in
PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 233, 235–36, 241–42.
325. See Langley, Kenyon & Bailin, supra note 57, at 1, 7–8, 13–14. One surprise in Fields
was that the settlement did not include a long-term increase of the PILOT agreement Princeton
University remits. See Office of Commc’ns, supra note 269.
326. See Keith M. Phaneuf, House Approves Bill to Restrict Tax Exemption for Colleges,
Hospitals, CONN. MIRROR (May 22, 2015), http://ctmirror.org/2015/05/22/house-approvesbill-to-restrict-tax-exemption-for-colleges-and-hospitals/ [https://perma.cc/MUR8-JB4L].
327. See S. 1070, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015). See generally Carbone &
Brody, supra note 324.
328. See Are PILOTs About to Land in Massachusetts?, LEGAL CTR. NONPROFITS (Feb. 24,
2013),
http://www.legalcenterfornonprofits.org/2013/02/24/are-pilots-about-to-land-inmassachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/CQK7-RN2S]; MMA Legislative Package, MASS. MUN.
ASS’N, https://www.mma.org/advocacy/mma-legislative-package [https://perma.cc/YSB6NLLF] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
329. See H.R. 1565, 190th Gen. Court, 7th Sess. (Mass. 2017); MMA Legislative Package,
supra note 328; see also Woods Bowman, Impact Fees: An Alternative to PILOTS, in
PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 301, 302 (discussing flaws with
PILOTs).
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require constitutional amendments or significant statutory reform to allow
not only for the tax itself but also for the inequality in the rate scheme.330
4. Greater Alignment in Michigan?
In Michigan, legislation was introduced in 2016 to align property-tax
exemptions more directly with federal exemptions after nonprofits across the
state received unexpected tax bills.331 The tabled bill would have considered
a § 501(c)(3) status to be proof that an organization is charitable; property
use consistent with federally exempt purposes would be exempt. This change
would have removed an exclusive-use test in Michigan law and given
nonprofits assurance that complying with federal standards would protect
them at the state level.332 Thus, this proposed system would have essentially
deferred questions regarding qualification for state exemptions to compliance
with federal law. But where the federal law uses UBIT to tax revenues that
cross over into the zone of commerciality, the Michigan proposal did not
provide a means for municipalities to receive partial payments for complex
property uses. After being tabled in the session ending 2016, this Michigan
proposal has not yet been reintroduced.333
5. California’s Sophisticated Formula
California has long had one of the better solutions to the problem of the
complex nature of nonprofit business.334 In 1988, the state legislature
incorporated the federal UBIT system in its assessment.335 Where a UBIT
fragmentation does not map onto a physical piece of property, the law applies
a specific formula for factoring the income proportion of UBIT into the
valuation and tax assessment.336 This schema encompasses academic
properties337 as well as ones with exemptions for “religious, hospital,
scientific, or charitable purposes.”338 It creates certainty and better aligns
with federal policy. Importantly, it employs a mechanism for assessment
when a nonexempt use is neither the primary use of the property nor isolated
in a specific portion of it.

330. This is because nonprofit tax exemptions are found in many state constitutions, as are
requirements for substantial equality in taxation. See William B. Barker, The Three Faces of
Equality: Constitutional Requirements in Taxation, 57 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1, 14–18
(2006); Gallagher, supra note 19, at 4.
331. See S. 570, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015); Sherri Welch, Property Tax
Debate: What Is a Charity? Communities Question Status of Some, Send Property Tax Bills,
CRAIN’S DET. BUS. (Oct. 23, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20161023/
NEWS/161029936/property-tax-debate-what-is-a-charity [https://perma.cc/L5J3-YM38].
332. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.7o (West 2018).
333. See Search Bills by Category, MICH. LEGISLATURE, http://www.legislature.
mi.gov/(S(eactru4zirjossoihsv4mvhw))/mileg.aspx?page=CategorySearchM
[https://perma.cc/8W47-ZB6Z] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (search category “Property tax”).
334. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214.05 (West 2017); Gallagher, supra note 19, at 8.
335. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214.05(a).
336. See id. § 214.05(b)(3).
337. See id. § 214(b)–(c), (e).
338. Id. § 214(a).
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In many states, UBIT is only integrated in corporate income-tax
exemptions,339 not ones for property tax. Yet as this Note argues, as long as
ad valorem property taxes provide the main source of revenues for
municipalities, property-tax exemptions for complex nonprofit businesses
will remain controversial. Because property ownership is a key factor in
producing revenues, untaxed commercial uses of property will continue to
require justification. Most existing partial taxation laws allow for flexibility
with leases and nonexempt activities but are still too tied to ideas of
physically separable space. California’s system is more nuanced, while its
reference to the federal UBIT rules allows for relatively simple compliance.
IV. A RESOLUTION?
The next round of state law reform regarding nonprofits or property taxes
should tackle these discrepancies directly by leaning on both the California
and Connecticut statutory regimes as well as aspects of the proposed
legislation in Massachusetts.
Legislative reforms that give nonprofits certainty are preferable to
piecemeal litigation.340 Good reform would clarify the law, better align with
federal policy, and give consistency to PILOTs now made on an ad hoc basis.
States with profit tests should either make explicit that Bayh-Dole activities
will not void property-tax exemptions or indicate precisely how such
activities will be assessed.
State property-tax laws should face up to the contemporary business
practices of universities, hospitals, and other large nonprofits. Compensation
to local communities for the distorting effects of large tax-exempt institutions
on local revenues and costs should be more coherent. Using a state-mediated
mechanism, as in the Connecticut model, would add an important level of
fairness to any PILOT regime. Yet, as discussed above, this alone is
insufficient. Instead, payments from nonprofits should be tied to a new
formula that uses UBIT or other clear guidelines to assess truly nonexempt
property uses, as in the California model, possibly with discounts for local
benefits provided, as in the Massachusetts proposal. Just as states have begun
requiring that hospitals provide community benefits,341 similar standards for
academic institutions could clarify local service expectations now negotiated

339. See, e.g., Marianne Evans, Allison Hedges & Kathleen Zack, State Taxation of Exempt
Organizations’ Unrelated Business Income, TAX ADVISOR (June 1, 2013),
http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2013/jun/clinic-story-03.html [https://perma.cc/P3NTED3N].
340. See supra notes 316–18 and accompanying text.
341. See Brody, supra note 260, at 260; Gallagher, supra note 19, at 12.
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ad hoc.342 Constitutional limits on state laws would provide further
assurances of consistency and fairness.343
An ideal reform might combine all of these mechanisms. Thus, a hospital
or university would pay ad valorem taxes for identifiable fractions of parcels
used for nonexempt purposes by applying a set fraction derived from the
institution’s UBIT or via a clearly defined calculation of non-exempt
revenues. Additionally, it would be eligible for credits or deductions for
qualifying provision of state or local benefits. These taxes would be collected
at the state level and remitted to municipalities. Such reforms may not satisfy
the harshest critics of elite universities, but they would better balance
complex social needs.
Whether or not states adopt comprehensive reform measures, a repeal of
Bayh-Dole is unlikely. Thus, states with profit tests should at least resolve
how a nonprofit engaged in patenting can maintain a property-tax exemption.
CONCLUSION
Although the case settled, Fields challenges the current status quo and
reveals its shortcomings. Questions about how to best favor the public’s
interest in a thriving and independent charitable sector have provoked
controversy for decades. Still, state laws have failed to adequately
understand, accommodate, foster, and regulate the changing nature of
universities and other nonprofits. The most reasoned response would be to
see these issues as policy choices better submitted to legislatures than judges.

342. See, e.g., Community Benefits Agreement, COLUMBIA U., http://gca.
columbia.edu/content/community-benefits-agreement [https://perma.cc/X9MR-SF99] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2018). See generally Trs. of Columbia Univ. & W. Harlem Local Dev. Corp.,
West
Harlem
Community
Benefits
Agreement
(May
18,
2009),
https://gca.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/2016-11/CBAAgreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FQS-DY69].
343. See supra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.

